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Introduction: 
 
Intra-EU migration is a phenomenon innate to the structure of the 
European Union. A politico-economic union of twenty-eight countries, the EU 
does what no other alliance of countries has endeavored before, serving as a 
unique product of globalization and integration, in every sense of the word. 
Bound almost entirely by a common currency, the European Union is established 
in the belief that economic cooperation in Europe can be achieved through the 
principle of free movement, despite each member states’ individual way of life, 
language, and political, religious, and cultural ideology.  
Since intra-EU migration allows for the possibility of EU integration and 
spans virtually every country within the Union, the question is how has intra-EU 
migration impacted the relationship of EU member states and the larger project for “ever-
closer union”? Will and can the EU be an institution founded on the notion of 
collaboration for economic prosperity, or will the interests of the nation state 
obstruct the EU’s ability to transcend cultural differences? Exploring these two 
questions, and the sub-questions implicit within them, this thesis aims to reach a 
sounder comprehension of the political impact this stream of migration has 
across the EU.  
Despite the purported economic contributions that EU migrants make to 
the countries to which they migrate, the political and social costs of intra-EU 
migration that have followed from this stream of migration have, for many 
member states, exceeded their economic benefits. This is especially true for 
Britain, where the global powerhouse boasts one of Europe’s strongest 
economies. If the EU continues to allow the free movement principle to operate 
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in its current form, then it may see an increase in cultural conflict in countries 
like Britain, where nationalism has, in many ways, been aroused by the 
increasing diversity of its population.  Likewise, if the free movement principle, 
which serves as a prerequisite for EU membership, is jeopardized, it may alter 
the solidarity and cooperation of European countries “united in diversity”. In 
order to evaluate the complexity of free movement in the EU, its theoretical, 
economic, political, and cultural implications must be evaluated. 
 
1. Literature Review 
1.1 The Single Market: Economic Impact and Labor Mobility 
The EU was created under the guise that endorsing a single market could 
better promote economic prosperity across Europe. A fundamental component of 
this is the adopting of a common currency, the euro, on January 1, 2002. The euro 
is a major expression of supporting a single market. As Thomas Risse (2006) 
argues, “money is not only about economics and finance, but also about nation 
and state-building. Money is among the most important identity markers in 
people’s daily lives.”1 In a Eurobarometer survey, evidence shows that the euro, 
despite its strength as compared to many other European currencies, affects the 
collective identity of the EU, and in many ways, threatens national pride, 
particularly for countries like Britain.2  
The single market also incorporates the notion of free movement, or the 
freedom that grants all EU members the right to live and work in another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fishman, Robert M., and Anthony M. Messina. The Year of the Euro. “Chapter Three: The Euro 
Between National and European Identity” Risse, Thomas. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2006. http://undpress.nd.edu/books/P01047. 
2 Risse, Thomas. p. 69 	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member state. The data on migration measures the flows of individuals to and 
from different member states. They can be used, for example, to showcase the 
surge of migration that occurred during the 2004 EU enlargement, which 
produced the accession of ten Eastern European countries. Conversely, it can 
express the effects migrants make on a given country’s labor market or public 
services. Broadly speaking, migration statistics define “migrant” in three ways: a) 
someone born in a country different from that which they predominately reside; 
b) someone whose nationality is different than the country in which they reside; 
or c) someone whose country of residence has changed for a brief period of time.3 
While the first two definitions of “migrant” are fairly transparent, the third is 
more difficult to determine. Otherwise known as a third-country national, this 
type of migrant’s distinct method of migrating is more challenging to quantify.4 
This in itself illuminates the difficulties in dissecting migration data. 
For this reason, several reliable indices have been developed for 
quantifying EU migration. These include: the International Passenger Survey, 
Labour Force Survey, National Insurance Numbers (NINos), Migration Statistics 
Quarterly Report, and Eurostat. For example, the International Passenger Survey 
notes that net migration to the UK, in the year ending in March 2015, was 
333,000.5 Likewise, as of the first quarter of 2015, approximately 1.9 million EU 
born citizens were employed in the UK.6 In determining different outcomes of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hawkins, Oliver. “Briefing Paper: Migration Statistics.” House of Commons Library, September 2, 2015. 
4 “EMN Synthesis Report - Intra-EU Mobility of Third-Country Nationals.” European Migration Network, 
July 2013, 60. 
5 “Bulgarian and Romanian Migration to the UK,” November 27, 2014. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/november-
2014/sty-bulgarian-and-romanian-migration-to-the-uk.html. 
6 Vargas-Silva, Carlos. “Migration Flows of A8 and Other EU Migrants to and from the UK.” Migration 
Observatory. Oxford, England: University of Oxford, April 10, 2014. 
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EU migration story, such figures allow us to investigate the economic impact EU 
migrants are having and have had on the European Union. 
Migration statistical data also provide a comprehensive understanding of 
how certain events over time impact the rate to which people choose to migrate 
to another member state. Events such as the European financial crisis, for 
example, stimulated migration flows to countries such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This event triggered east-west migration, 
increasing migration from the periphery to the core.7 As of 2010, the EU countries 
holding the largest number of EU migrants were: Germany, Spain, France, the 
UK, and Italy. Each country contained over a million migrants.8 In addition to 
drawing connections between events, migration data provide the reasons for 
migrating, which most notably are: to seek better employment opportunities, 
reunite with family and provide family members with an increased quality of 
life, and enhance one’s education level, or obtain superior retirement benefits. 
These opportunity differentials indicate to what extent free movement is utilized, 
quantifying the impact of intra-EU migration on the labor market, public 
services, and communities of EU member states.9 Although migration statistics 
express the advantages gained by migrating, such as to benefit from welfare 
tourism, extensive data demonstrate that EU citizens migrate primarily to work, 
and thus might make a positive economic impact on the country to which they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brauninger, Dieter. “The Dynamics of Migration in the Euro Area.” Deutsche Bank Research EU 
Monitor: European Integration (July 14, 2014). 
8 Vargas-Silva, Carlos. “Briefing: EU Migrants in Other EU Countries: An Analysis of Bilateral Migrant 
Stocks.” Migration Observatory, University of Oxford UK, June 19, 2012.	  
9 Benton, Meghan, and Milica Petrovic. “How Free Is Free Movement? Dynamics and Drivers of 
Mobility within the European Union.” Migrationpolicy.org, March 2013, 1–25. 
Remeur, Cecile. “Welfare Benefits and Intra-EU Mobility.” Library of the European Parliament, 
September 24, 2013. 
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migrate.10 This contention in the facts will be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
There are significant disparities in the interpretation of the economic impact of 
migrants on the part of scholars.11 Notwithstanding the extensive evidence 
claiming that EU migrants economically improve, rather than harm the countries 
to which they migrate, few scholars are willing to reject the status quo, which 
takes a negative view on EU migrants and their labor mobility.  
 
1.2 The Theory of Intra-EU Migration  
Major discrepancies exist between the economic effects I previously 
outlined and the political motivations for supporting and opposing intra-EU 
migration. Fiscally speaking, the EU economy thrives off migration. Politically, 
migration creates a conflict of interest; it instigates economic competition 
between migrant workers and some natives and generally causes cultural 
conflict. Politicians use the topic of intra-EU migration to form allies among 
citizens, and their rhetoric filters down into news publications, influencing 
public opinion and distorting the evidence on intra-EU migration. Together the 
political, economic and cultural preferences of a country’s citizens lead EU 
politicians to act accordingly. For example, Hix and Noury (2006) cite that left-
wing politicians are more apt to support liberal migration policies, regardless of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso Frattini, and Caroline Halls. “Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits 
of A8 Migration to the UK*.” Fiscal Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 1–41. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
5890.2010.00106.x. 
“The Snarling Dud of May.” The Economist. Accessed October 21, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21672288-snarling-dud-may. 
Bogdanov, Latchezar. “Fiscal Impact of EU Migrants in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK,” no. European Citizen Action Service (October 2014). 
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the negative economic implications of an overly saturated workforce.12 In the 
same vein, right-wing politicians broadly support restrictive policies, despite the 
economic benefit of capital investment.13 Such contested viewpoints represent the 
complexity underlying the issue of intra-EU migration.  
When using a theoretical framework, the goals of the European Union are 
analogous to the international relations theory of interdependence, which states 
that countries look to implement international solutions to solve domestic 
problems. This notion of interdependence and “citizenship of the Union” 
emerged in the rhetoric of 2003 EU treaties; what it did was reaffirm the free 
movement principle. The theoretical foundation for the federation of the EU is 
divided into two waves: prior to the 1990s, the first wave embodied a bottom-up 
approach to EU governance; the second wave, which began in the 1990s, 
introduced the concept of “Europeanization”, where a top-down approach to 
integration has since been utilized. This shift showcases how the EU as a whole, 
has exercised more governing power, whereas, prior to the 1990s, individual 
countries in the EU were predominately more autonomous. Despite this, 
evidence shows that increasing EU migration levels are causing member states to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hix, Simon, and Abdul Noury. “Politics, Not Economic Interests: Determinants of Migration Policies 
in the European Union1.” International Migration Review 41, no. 1 (2007): 182–205. 
doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00061.x. 
13 Shaw, Jo. “Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU Free Movement Rules 
and National Immigration Law.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, July 23, 2015. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2655568. 
Faist, Thomas, and Andreas Ette. The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration. 
Accessed September 22, 2015. http://www.palgrave.com%2Fpage%2Fdetail%2Fthe-
europeanization-of-national-policies-and-politics-of-immigration-thomas-
faist%2F%3Fisb%3D9781403987136. 
Portes, Jonathan. “What Would UK Immigration Policy Look like after Brexit?” National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, n.d. Accessed September 23, 2015. 
Ibid. 
Macron, Emmanuel. The Way Forward for Europe: A Union of Solidarity and Differentiation? LSE European 
Institute “Perspectives on Europe” Public Lecture, n.d. Accessed September 24, 2015. 	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retreat to the bottom-up approach, fearing that intra-EU migration threatens the 
political, economic, and cultural values of the nation state. 
Since the late 1990s, with the Treaty on European Union (formally known 
as the 1993 Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty on the Functions of the European 
Union (formally known as the 1958 Treaty of Rome), the valued, yet feared 
principal of free movement has encouraged anti-migration sentiments, 
particularly as the EU as a whole has suffered from the financial and economic 
crises of member states.14 Such events played a role in the institutionalization of 
EU member states placing restrictions on their labor markets during enlargement 
years. In particular, the 2004 Enlargement was characterized by such strict 
limitations on labor mobility, where countries determined whether or not newly 
accepted members of the EU could immediately work in the current member 
states; during this wave, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland were the only three 
countries that did not enforce seven-year restrictions. The decisions by these 
countries to do so is in part a reason why public opinion in Britain has grown 
less favorable toward EU integration, as its decision served as a driver for the 
surge of Eastern European migrants15. The consequences that derived from the 
2004 enlargement and its affect on England will be discussed in detail in 
Chapters 1, 3, and 4.  
 
 1.3 The Politics of Britain and Resistance Towards Integration  
Politicians and policymakers are consistently framing the contentious 
topic of intra-EU migration in relation to its effects economically and culturally. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ersanilli, Evelyn. “Mass-Migration Fears in Europe: Some Facts about Intra-EU Mobility | Debating 
Development.” Accessed September 22, 2015. http://blog.qeh.ox.ac.uk/?p=621.	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A political schism on the issue is especially evident in Britain, where the political 
discourse reflects a disconnect between the responsibility of the member state to 
abide by the law set forth by the European Union regarding free movement, and 
the need for politicians to respond to their respective constituents’ opinions. In 
recent years, xenophobic politics in Britain has become the norm. While some 
countries, like Germany, have championed greater economic, political, and 
cultural integration, the anti-immigration sentiment has underpinned popular 
support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a party highly 
critical of pro-migration policies and the EU overall. UKIP members believe that 
the EU diminishes political representation and fiscal stability in Britain. Many of 
its members, like Peter Whittle, a UKIP candidate for London Mayor, have 
criticized those who frame Euroskeptics as xenophobes, a claim often made by 
supporters of the EU and the free movement principle.16 According to Theresa 
May, the free movement principle has been misinterpreted: it was founded on 
the idea that EU members would have the ability to work in another country, 
rather than move in order to obtain work benefits from another country.17 May 
echoes the sentiments of many who believe that the free movement principle 
overreaches its original goal of facilitating economic cooperation.   
On the other side of the political divide are the supporters of the Labour 
Party, previously led by Ed Miliband, and the Conservative Party, whose leader, 
David Cameron, was re-elected Prime Minister this past May. For Labour, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “London Labour Mayor Hopeful Writes off Half the Population as ‘Xenophobes.’” UKIP. Accessed 
October 21, 2015. 
http://www.ukip.org/london_labour_mayor_hopeful_writes_off_half_the_population_as_xeno
phobes. 
17 Glaze, Ben. “Theresa May Blames Britain’s Soaring Immigration on the EU.” Mirror. Accessed 
September 22, 2015. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/theresa-blames-britains-soaring-
immigration-6351833. 
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building a shared society is integral to the success of Britain and Europe; 
increased migration and integration should be welcomed with open arms.18 
Rather, for Prime Minister David Cameron, renegotiating with the EU to mend 
free movement rules by dis-incentivizing migrants through cuts to welfare 
benefits is necessary, as he believes integration will incur negative costs on 
British society.19 Altogether, these statements reflect the reality that Britain has a 
more antagonistic relationship with the EU than many other member states. In 
addition, these views illustrate just how contested the political rhetoric in Britain 
is.20 The June 2016 UK Referendum will clarify how important EU migration to 
Britain is in deciding on their membership status in the EU. 
Strongly correlated with political discourse is public opinion and life 
satisfaction of citizens, which are both dependent on various economic, cultural, 
and historical events.21 Recently, the Survation poll for the Daily Mail, a 
conservative British newspaper, found that, of the 49 percent of Brits who wish 
the UK to stay in the European Union, 22 percent said they would change their 
mind if the migrant crisis worsened.22 Many who hold leadership positions in 
Britain have expressed similar sentiments: Theresa May of the British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Ed Miliband’s Speech on Immigration.” Accessed October 21, 2015. 
http://press.labour.org.uk/post/116721382454/ed-milibands-speech-on-immigration. 
19 “PM Speech on Immigration - Speeches - GOV.UK.” Accessed October 21, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-immigration. 
20 Benhabib, Seyla. “In Search of Europe’s Borders.” Dissent, Fall 2002. 
Ibid. 
“This Referendum Is Not about Leaving ‘Europe’ - It Is about Our EU Membership.” UKIP. Accessed 
October 21, 2015. 
http://www.ukip.org/this_referendum_is_not_about_leaving_europe_it_is_about_our_eu_mem
bership. 
Ibid. 
Pitas, Costas. “Amid Migrant Crisis, Poll Shows UK’s Anti-EU Camp Taking Lead.” Reuters UK. 
Accessed September 22, 2015. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/06/uk-britain-eu-poll-
idUKKCN0R50X820150906. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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Conservative Party, for example, recently has called Europe a “system of no 
borders.”23 While politicians like May blame EU policy, others like Alp Mehmet 
of Migration Watch, a UK immigration think tank, place the responsibility to fix 
the migrant problem in Britain on the political parties themselves: “these figures 
do not surprise me. Labour let immigration get out of control and the Coalition 
Government couldn’t get a grip on it. Now it is down to the Conservative 
Government to try to get a grip.”24 What troubles many British citizens is the 
uncertainty of how long these migrants, particularly those from Eastern Europe, 
will stay in Britain.25 While EU migration has positively contributed to Britain in a 
myriad of ways, the growing skepticism apparent within the political system and 
public sphere has branded EU migrants and European integration in a negative 
light.26 
 
 1.4 It’s Not Economic. It’s Cultural. 
Multiculturalism in Europe is a product of globalization and such 
multiculturalism complicates the goals of integration. According to Bond (2011), 
“culture determines identity, and maintaining traditional religious faith can help 
bond communities – a little Anatolia in Berlin, an echo of Algeria in the Parisian 
suburbs, a miniature Pakistan in the English Midlands”.27 Conversely, 
multiculturalism feeds popular fears of increased crime, political backlash, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid. 
24 Dawar, Anil. “Eight Million Migrants Live in UK: Calls for Britain to Quit EU to Halt Soaring 
Migration.” Express.co.uk, August 25, 2015. 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/600739/Britain-migrants-eight-million. 
25 Burrell, Kathy. “Staying, Returning, Working and Living: Key Themes in Current Academic Research 
Undertaken in the UK on Migration Movements from Eastern Europe.” Social Identities 16, no. 3 
(May 1, 2010): 297–308. doi:10.1080/13504630.2010.482401. 
26 Behr, Rafael. “Setting the Record Straight on the EU.” New Statesman, December 2013. 
27 Bond, Martyn. “Multicultural Europe?” Chatham House, World Today, 67, no. 6 (June 2011): 14. 
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concerns about job security and welfare benefits, and suspicion among 
nationals.28 In British neighborhoods, it has purportedly created an erosion of 
cohesion between residents, political backlash, and a lack of belonging toward 
the mainstream British way of life for certain ethnics groups.29 This is particularly 
true in regards to the Polish community in Britain, which has been subject to 
marginalization, as the introduction of multiculturalism in Britain perpetuated 
certain stereotypes or classifications and hindered their social mobility.30 These 
sentiments are not as stridently proclaimed in Scandinavian countries, where 
migrants are perceived as positive contributors to the diversification of Europe 
and Scandinavia as a whole; this, however, may be due to the fact that these 
countries have not experienced the level of migration, which Britain has 
experienced.31 Such diverse, subjective interpretations of the effects of 
multiculturalism showcase the complexity of the issue, as it affects all EU 
member states differently. 
Even more so, with the ever-decreasing rates of “native” fertility, it 
remains clear that the challenge of diversity will only grow, as native 
populations age and EU countries continue to diversify; this may in turn lead to 
cultural conflicts across groups as migration becomes more prevalent.32 Such a 
reality has leaders like German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to claim that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lesińska, Magdalena. “The European Backlash against Immigration and Multiculturalism.” Journal of 
Sociology 50, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 37–50. doi:10.1177/1440783314522189. 
29 Finney, Nissa, and Stephen Jivraj. “Ethnic Group Population Change and Neighbourhood 
Belonging.” Urban Studies Journal Limited, Urban Studies at 50, 50, no. 16 (December 2013). 
30 Drzewiecka, Jolanta A., Joshua F. Hoops, and Ryan J. Thomas. “Rescaling the State and Disciplining 
Workers in Discourses on E.U. Polish Migration in U.K. Newspapers.” Critical Studies in Media 
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31 Lauristin, Marju. “Diversity of Our Societies and the Intra-EU Labour Migration.” Tartu University, 
n.d. 
32 Andreason, Aaron. “Will the EU Survive Its Demographic Deficit?” Yale Economic Review 7, no. 1 
(January 1, 2011): 19. 
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goals of multiculturalism have failed.33 Given that the EU is established under the 
notion that collaboration is beneficial, Merkel’s statement is ironic. It alludes to 
the social and cultural side effects that underpin EU migration. Cultural 
diversity, as discussed by Martyn Bond, “has been the source of many of our 
continent’s greatest achievements – but, when mishandled, has also played a part 
in some of its greatest tragedies.”34 For Britain, EU identity and British identity 
appear to be at odds with one another, where, to the perception of some, only 
one is capable of surviving. The psychology behind how the British choose to 
express such patriotism, in relation to their opinions of the EU, has not been 
abundantly researched.35  
 
1.5 The Turkish Case and European Identity  
The European Union provides a platform to ask questions regarding the 
importance of nationalism, integration, and migration in international relations. 
Even more so, it begs us to question whether or not the EU has certain cultural 
prerequisites to join: “the EU supposedly rests on a proven capacity to sustain a 
set of institutions, which, although originating in the West, are in principle 
capable of functioning on other soils and in other cultures as well. European 
identity is not given a thick cultural or historical coating; no exclusionary appeals 
are made to commonalities of history or faith, language or customs…it is the will 
to live together in the future, and not the fractious past, that defines the new 
European federation.”36 Understanding the makeup of the EU will bring to light 
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the reasons why the membership of certain countries creates a more contentious 
environment and likewise, what the unspoken characteristics of EU membership 
truly are. This brings forth the issue of EU membership for Turkey.  
While EU membership has been contemplated for countries like Iceland, 
Norway, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the membership of Turkey in the EU 
poses a particularly unique challenge to the future of the European Union. In the 
case of Turkey, an implicit qualification for EU membership is identified: 
affiliation to a Christian religion. In fact, many studies explore the notion that 
Turkish migrants are perceived more negatively then other immigrant groups, 
perhaps for the very reason mentioned above.37 Its stark cultural differences are 
what make Turkey such a fascinating study within the discourse of intra-EU 
migration; not a EU member itself, but not an irrelevant player in EU affairs, the 
potential inclusion of Turkey forces us to come to terms with the role culture 
plays in supporting the goals of the EU and whether or not cultural cooperation, 
just like political and economic cooperation, can exist in upholding an EU 
“united in diversity”. 
Over the course of the past half-century, Turkey has faced multiple 
rejections for EU membership, despite its willingness to reform on a political and 
economic level.38 Even without EU membership, however, Turkey is an 
influential component of the EU; the country represents the second largest group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Yavçan, Başak. “Public Opinion toward Immigration and the EU: How Are Turkish Immigrants 
Different than Others?” Turkish Studies 14, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 158–78. 
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38 Mandel, Ruth. “Fifty Years of Migration, Fifty Years of Waiting: Turkey, Germany and the European 
Union.” German Politics & Society 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 66–78. Doi: 10.3167/gps.2013.310206. 
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after ethnic German emigrants in Germany.39 Outside of Germany, Turks are 
especially visible in countries like the UK and France, too. This distinction of 
ethnic groups, like the Turks and Western European groups, has led to a 
nationalist intolerance in places like Greece, where a formal mosque, in the city 
of Athens, still to this day does not exist.40 It leads many to believe, as a plethora 
of scholarship shows, that the fear of a so-called “cultural invasion” supersedes a 
EU fear of economic downfall.41 The implications this theory holds, that is, that 
the inclusion of Turkey in the EU would further heighten cultural, economic, and 
political concerns between EU countries, will be further evaluated in Chapter 5.  
 
2. The Argument  
By taking into account these various factors that relate to intra-EU 
migration, I set forth the framework to establish my argument. In the midst of 
refugee crises, political discourse on building walls to keep illegal immigrants 
out of the United States, and the obvious presence of globalization that has 
blurred the borders of continent and state, lays the largely ignored phenomenon 
of intra-EU migration. Intra-EU migration, a fundamental component of the free 
movement principle and embedded in the founding document of the European 
Union, has generated benefits while also presenting problems for EU member 
states. Although this stream of migration is legal, it has sparked popular 
sentiments of xenophobia in some countries, which has led to potential turmoil, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Kaya, Asiye. Special Issue: The Fiftieth Anniversary of Migration from Turkey to Germany. Introduction: 
(Re) Considering the Last Fifty Years of Migration and Current Immigration Policies In Germany. 
Berghahn, 2013. 
40 Triandafyllidou, Anna, and Hara Kouki. “Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The Emergence 
of Nationalist Intolerance.” Ethnicities 13, no. 6 (December 1, 2013): 709–28. Doi: 
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causing member states to grow further apart, rather than closer together, and 
thus endangering the goal of 28 countries to be “united in diversity”, as the EU 
motto states. In particular, the impacts of intra-EU migration on Britain serve as a 
unique case study for understanding the boundaries between the EU and 
country, illustrating how nationality, culture, politics, and public opinion come 
into play as levels of EU migration continue to surge. While the issue of intra-EU 
migration can be understood through the lens of its economic, political, cultural, 
and national implications, scholars have not been able to come to consensus with 
regards to which of these factors is most threatening toward the maintaining and 
advancing of the project for ever closer union.  
Since the topic of intra-EU migration is one that has not been analyzed as 
closely as the issues underlying international migration, a crucial piece of the 
immigration and migration discourse is lacking. The phenomenon of intra-EU 
migration derives in part from the fact that intra-EU migration is legal. It is the 
right of all EU citizens to partake in it and thus member states lack the governing 
power to regulate it through policymaking. While the free movement principle 
was enacted to foster economic prosperity for the countries that choose to 
participate, the cultural implications have become a cause of concern for 
countries, like Britain, that view free movement as an attraction for unskilled 
migrants and individuals whose presence will ultimately change the cultural 
composition of the country. This issue could alter what the European Union does 
and will represent, as it will challenge whether cultural prerequisites may exist 
for EU admission in the future. 
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 2.1 Why Britain?  
For some scholars, politicians, leaders, and citizens of Britain, intra-EU 
migration is more than just a battle for economic prosperity and political power; 
it has signified a struggle to preserve mainstream British culture. Britain, one of 
the four countries comprised of the United Kingdom, has historically maintained 
a less pro-EU mentality towards integration. The political and economic 
implications of intra-EU migration come together to unveil the true controversy 
behind free movement, where the pressing issue is the threat to national culture. 
Britain exhibits a unique case in which intra-EU migration and the subject of EU 
integration is a prominent and contentious issue.  
Britain is attractive for its location within the European markets, language, 
adequate school system, business opportunities, culture, and lifestyle.42 Most 
notably, in general, Britain is a popular destination for Bulgarian, Romanian, and 
Polish migrants – all which have contributed to increasing fear and hostility 
among British citizens. For the year ending in March 2015, statistics show that 
53,000 EU2 citizens (citizens from the countries of Bulgaria and Romania that 
joined the EU in 2007) migrated to Britain.43 However, while migration to Britain 
captures the arrival of EU citizens from all over Europe, the biggest issue has 
been regarding migrants who do not fit the general racial and religious 
composition of British citizens – most noticeably, Eastern Europeans migrants.44 
One defining factor of this immense influx of migrants to Britain, over the course 
of the last four years, is the elimination of the imposed labor restriction in 2011, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Rolfe, H. “Is Our Immigration Policy Attracting the ‘Brightest and Best’ Entrepreneurs to the UK?” 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, June 2, 2013. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ford, Robert. “Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain 
Is Affected by Migrants’ Region of Origin.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 7 (April 
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which restricted access to the labor market for EU2 citizens.45 These restrictions 
actually created a surge of high-skilled migrants from non-EEA countries to the 
British labor market.46 Britain has also remained attractive to EU migrants 
because of its flexible and unregulated labor market and absence of vocational 
education and training, which has created a need for migrant workers.47 Despite 
regulations that were put into place to monitor the entry of migrants into the 
labor market, enforcement has been lacking. Many companies looking to hire 
migrants have therefore found loopholes in the system, providing social 
assistance to individuals who do not yet qualify to work in the EU.48 
When analyzing the case of Britain, migration data not only showcases 
how Britain has become one of the most desirable countries to migrate to; data 
also display how migrants have shaped the labor force. Britain is a unique case 
because it primarily attracts skilled migrants who are geographically dispersed 
across the country. However, despite being high skilled, many migrants to 
Britain are employed in jobs below their skill level.49 According to data from 2013, 
EU-27 citizens (citizens from the countries of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
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represented 5% of total employment in Britain.50 Unlike the popular assumption 
expressed by politicians and public opinion polls that migrants create a negative 
economic impact on the EU countries they migrate to, scholars like Dustmann 
and Frattini provide evidence to showcase that EEA immigrants, in particular, 
have made a positive contribution to Britain, contributing 10% more than natives 
between 1995 and 2011.51 Such studies directly contradict political rhetoric, which 
claims EU migrants have a negative effect on the economy of the states they 
migrate to.  
Perhaps even more illuminating is the following results from a Dustmann 
and Frattini study: between 2001-11, EEA migrants contributed to one-third more 
in revenues than in public spending.52 Further studies from Dustmann and 
Frattini demonstrate that the use of public goods by EU migrants does not 
burden British citizens; instead, migration allows for the sharing of public goods 
to be dispersed among a larger population, which should theoretically make 
them cheaper.53 Further research by the European Citizen Action Service, too, 
found that migrants have a rather small impact on the public finances of a host 
country. This information demystifies the notion that intra-EU migration is a net 
cost to the migrant-receiving member states.54 Still, despite these telling statistics, 
sufficient data is still lacking that might help clarify exactly how positive or 
negative intra-EU migration is overtime. These clarifications could be made in 
how much EU migrants spend on education, how much their children pay for 
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education, as well as how the use of government expenditures and revenues 
comes into play.55  
Each country in the EU has a different understanding of its role as a 
member state, as well as a different opinion regarding the issue of intra-EU 
migration. For southern EU states, like Italy and Greece, the primary cause of 
concern has always been international migration, given that they border the 
Mediterranean, Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Ionian, and Aegean seas. For most 
Scandinavian countries, which traditionally have a more homogenous 
population, intra-EU migration has seldom been a contentious topic. Given their 
economic supremacy, countries like Britain and Germany have predominantly 
been responsible for managing fiscal issues that have affected the EU, which also 
means they have bore the burdens of larger inflows of migration. Their economic 
success and stability is central to their attraction of EU migrants. While Germany 
has altogether taken a fairly positive approach to intra-EU migration, Britain has 
not, as previously discussed, expressed similar sentiments.  
For Britain, the free movement principle signifies just one of the many 
rules that has been imposed on them, due to EU admission. Given that Britain 
has largely attempted to distinguish itself from other EU countries (for example, 
its desire to use an entirely different currency), it is crucial to analyze how their 
response towards intra-EU migration differs from that of other EU countries and 
how this response may or may not create a domino effect for other member 
states. Given that the UK will have a referendum in June 2016 on whether or not 
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to remain in the EU, it is particularly timely that Britain be used as a case study 
for answering this research question.  
 
2.3 Organizational Structure  
In this thesis, I will study the economic, cultural, political, and historical 
implications of intra-EU migration in order to understand how these factors may 
or may not significantly impinge on the integration of EU member states. I do so 
through the evaluation of scholarly material, statistics pertaining to the 
movement and impact thereof of EU nationals across the European Union, public 
opinion data, and personal interviews with three established academics from UK 
universities, who have provided me with primary evidence on the role of intra-
EU migration. This chapter expresses a review of the secondary literature on the 
function and effects of intra-EU migration, as well as outlines my central 
theoretical argument.  
In chapter one, I begin with a historical examination of intra-EU 
migration, by discussing EU growth from the seven EU enlargements, which 
have each individually, shaped the EU’s current form and served to increase 
political salience in the region and the notion behind the free movement 
principle. In chapter two, I provide the economic framework for intra-EU 
migration, assessing whether or not intra-EU migration has positively or 
negatively contributed to labor mobility and the economy of member states. I do 
so by analyzing the single market system and compiling scholarly data on the 
economic impact of migrants. In chapter three, I discuss how cultural conflict, the 
most controversial and potentially severing of factors discussed in this thesis, has 
sparked from intra-EU migration. Here, I will examine cultural contention in the 
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EU post the 2004 enlargement, addressing how member states have dealt with 
changes to the nation state. In chapter four, I assess how the conclusions drawn 
out in the prior chapters pertain to the case of Britain; I articulate Britain’s special 
relationship with the EU and its sentiments towards EU migration, as it is 
expressed through public opinion polls, British political parties, British law and 
policy, and primary source interviews with three UK university academics in 
London. In chapter five, I expand on the discourse of intra-EU migration by 
delving into the potential for a EU accession for Turkey, considering what it 
means to be a member of the European Union and what it means to be European. 
Lastly, I conclude by summarizing the challenges of the EU for the future, 
question how member states can maintain a sense of national identity, whilst 
contributing wholly to a union of diverse European countries, and suggest how 
further research may expand on the contributions of my thesis.  
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Chapter One 
Growing the Union – History of Enlargements and Free Movement 
 
Outline: 
The genesis of the European Union began with the unwavering efforts of 
French diplomat, Jean Monnet and French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. 
These two men, who fervently believed in the “virtues” and “necessity” of 
European integration, intellectually constructed the foundation for what is today 
known as the European Union. Monnet and Schuman are credited with 
launching the Schuman Plan to restructure the distribution of coal and steel 
across Europe, striving to establish newfound European integration. Since the 
birth of the Schuman Plan on May 9, 1950, European countries have 
subsequently forged new treaties and rules, growing closer together, under the 
guise that unity in diversity supersedes the benefits of national political and 
economic independence. 
The European Union today varies tremendously politically, economically, 
and culturally from Monnet and Schuman’s European Community. As Miles and 
Redmond observe (1996)56, “the consensus of the original six 
[Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands] has been 
gradually eroded by the accession of new members with politico-economic 
cultures which were different to theirs and which generated intergovernmental 
attitudes and/or were based on a very strong perception of the objective of 
participation in the EU as being the pursuit of economic self-interest.” Therefore, 
in order to understand the various implications that comprise the impact of intra-
EU migration, it is imperative to understand its progression from a European 	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Community to a European Union. Europe’s history is embedded in a series of 
laws, treaties, acts, and enlargements that serve as the foundation for its far-
reaching influence and power in Europe and across the globe; the dominance of 
EU politics and its effect on international relations spans far beyond Europe 
today and its growth as a union over time alludes to several problems and 
challenges that it faces presently.  
An analysis of European history and EU enlargements will provide the 
framework for unraveling a complexly structured organization founded on ever 
changing circumstances, yet bound by tradition. The European Union is more 
than an alliance of countries that trade social and political cooperation for 
economic success; the EU serves as a unique case study, if not the only case, for 
the integration of different political systems, economic strategies, policy 
problems, and cultural preferences. In understanding these key historical events, 
we may begin to assess how enlargement years and changing laws do or do not 
effect current EU member state relations.  
In this chapter, I will begin to unpack the nuances affiliated with the 
relationship between member states and the European Union through its 
extensive history. I will briefly outline the history of the European Union since 
1945 to present day, from its birth with six founding member states, tracing its 
growth with each enlargement following, to its most recent addition of Croatia in 
2007. Secondly, I will discuss the purpose and importance of the free movement 
principle – the challenges and benefits it poses as the foundation of the European 
Union. In looking at both enlargement history and evaluating free movement, I 
hope to create the framework for evaluating when and how intra-EU migration 
affects the member state relationship.   
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Each EU enlargement should be studied individually because each 
enlargement tells a unique story, showcasing the immense growth of the 
European Union since 1945 and bringing to light the key periods of time where 
political and cultural salience existed; this becomes particularly noticeable, for 
example, with the 2004 enlargement of ten Eastern European countries. Prior to 
2004, enlargements were not widely discussed, nor were they politically, 
economically, or culturally salient; the countries that joined the EU prior to 2004 
were easily absorbable and the volume of migration was relatively modest. 
Taking a historical approach clarifies when and where challenges to EU 
integration exist, as it wasn’t until 2004 that EU political, economic, and cultural 
fears intensified.  
However, EU enlargements cannot be fully understood without taking 
into account the scope of the free movement principle, as it dictates the freedom 
allotted to each citizen under EU doctrines. Discussion and interpretations of the 
free movement principle influence political discourse and public opinion. Such 
opinions are historically correlated with the trends and surges in EU migration 
over time. Thus, by examining the historical context of the European Union and 
determining the role of intra-EU migration, inter-member state relations will be 
evaluated from past to present.  
 
1. Enlarging the EU 
1.1 The Founding Countries (1945 – 1971) 
The origins of the European Union lie in the bloody battles of World War 
II. According to Dinan (1999), Monnet “came to the conclusion early in World 
War II that economic integration was the only means by which conflict in Europe 
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would be avoided,” citing that national independence and economic 
protectionism would not result in a prosperous and peaceful Europe.57 Even 
before the onset of the European Union, the Economic Community originated 
under the guise that it could help restore peace, prosperity, and cooperation in 
Europe. Those, like Schuman and Monnet, who believed in this possibility, 
endeavored to begin with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. 
United in this goal of securing “lasting peace”, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands became the six founding countries for what 
would four decades later become the European Union.58 
The purpose of the European Coal and Steel Community was to facilitate 
political and economic unity. In fact, most countries that did join the European 
Community during this period (and in the future) did so to avoid political and 
economic isolation, rather than with the interest and intent to foster a notion of 
European integration and development.59 More specifically, the Treaty sought to 
create interdependence in both coal and steel so that individual countries could 
not “mobilize its armed forces without others knowing.”60 This goal is important 
because it symbolized a desire to ensure protection and defense across Europe. 
Overwhelmed by the Soviet Union’s advances in the space race and Communist 
takeover, this initial union of European states marks the onset of an east-west 
division.  
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Figure 1. Image of the founding countries of the European Coal and Steel Community
 
Source: BBC News (2014) 
 
1.2. The First Enlargement 
The early 1970s were characterized by an impending U.S. decline, uneven 
distribution of power among countries, the rise of Germany, and fluctuating 
exchange rates, all leading to complications for the European Community.61 The 
economic prowess of Germany, in particular, encouraged European collaboration 
for countries, like France, that were amidst an economic decline. For countries 
like Britain, enlargement would be critical to avoiding the political and economic 
takeover of Germany, especially in regards to Ostpolitik, or Germany’s “new 
eastern policy” to mend relations with Eastern Europe. In a 1971 white paper 	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issued by the British government, EU accession is described as an opportunity to 
provide security, peace, development, and economic prosperity that could not be 
adequately realized for Britain on its own. Interestingly enough, the document 
cited that British sovereignty would remain resilient, despite joining the Union; 
such a perspective uniquely expresses Britain’s particular relationship with the 
EU and directly notes the interests and concerns Britain had before joining.62 
Denmark, Ireland, and Norway also campaigned for European 
integration, each holding referendums for EC membership in the two years prior 
to 1973. Receiving a 53.5 percent vote against accession, Norway public opinion 
showed that its citizens did not view integration favorably, and thus they never 
did join. In Denmark, EC membership was welcomed with open arms, as Danish 
citizens believed that refraining from joining would be economically disastrous, 
given its vigorous trade relationship with Britain and Germany. Ireland would 
later be forced to join as well, under this logic, if it hoped to continue prospering 
economically in connection with Britain’s bustling economy.63 After much 
deliberation, the first EU Enlargement took place on January 1st of 1973, 
extending Community membership to Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
1.3 Six Additional Members (1973 – 1986) 
 While the last four decades showed significant progress in integration, the 
1980s were filled with a sense of fear and anxiety for the state of the European 
Community. Was it successful? Had it done enough to foster integration since 	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World War II? These were the questions being asked and answered in academic 
reports, like that of The European Community: Progress or Decline? Despite 
budgetary obstacles, a need for reform in the European Commission, and new 
political leadership in Britain and France, the accession of Greece, the first 
European Parliament Elections, and the inauguration of the Economic Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1979 culminated to form newfound revival and interest in 
deepening integration efforts. Still, the 1980s accession applications for Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal questioned whether the Community would crumble 
economically. 
Despite some misgivings on the part of European Union member states, 
these three countries would later join the Union (Greece in 1980 and Spain and 
Portugal in 1986). Their recent emergence from a dictatorial regime generated 
fear on the part of European Community members: France felt threatened by the 
potential inclusion of another Mediterranean power, while former European 
Commission president, Jenkins, was quick to express Greece’s lack of 
qualifications for membership.64 As the possibility for expanding the European 
Community became a reality, the importance of maintaining economic stability 
became ever more indicative of the Community’s mission and intentions.  
 The mid-1980s to early 1990s brought several accomplishments for the 
European Community. The Treaty of Rome was reformed to create the Single 
European Act, instituting the single market program. In addition to improving 
efficiency, trade, and competition, the program endeavored to revive poverty-
stricken Portugal and Spain. For both countries, joining the Community would 
aid in their physical isolation and assist in establishing their new democracies. 	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Yet, their economic state could cause problems for EC membership.65 The 
expansion of communism also removed several barriers between the east and 
west and individual European countries, spiking the level of asylum and refugee 
movements to Northern and Southern Europe.66 
The inclusion of additional countries to the European Community 
prompted the commitment to four freedoms: movement of goods, services, 
people, and food.67 It broadened the scope of the European Union, enhancing 
communication between European countries, particularly with the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999. The Maastricht Treaty is formally known as the birth of the European 
Union and the euro, the latter developed to encourage the economic and political 
exchange between member states. It did so, particularly, by creating a common 
foreign affairs policy and citizenship standards. Other political reinforcements 
that took place during the 1980s and 1990s include: improved cooperation 
between EU governments, in regards to defense and home affairs and increased 
power to make decisions for Parliament.68  
 
1.6 1995: The Eftan Enlargement 
 In 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, three members of the European 
Free Trade Association, joined the EU. The accession of these three countries, 
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according to Miles and Redmond (1996)69 primarily occurred under the guise that 
it was “now politically essential for each country to fully participate within EU 
decision-making.” Despite being allegedly uninterested in the support of a 
“Federal Europe”, or one that promoted political homogeneity, the inclusion of 
these affluent countries brought environmental issues, discussions of Third 
World development, and social policies to the forefront.70 The inclusion of 
Sweden and Finland, in particular, connected the European Union with the far 
north. Unlike Finland, Sweden was fairly Eurosceptic, although its deep 
economic recession was slightly alleviated by its membership. Contrastingly, 
Austria and Finland have a positive relationship with the EU, viewing its 
membership as a mechanism for enhancing security.71 Despite their reservations, 
the addition of these three countries would strengthen the EU’s desire to foster 
open government and democratic traditions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Miles and Redmond, p. 295. 
70 Dinan, Chapter 7; Miles and Redmond, p. 288. 
71 Dinan, Chapter 7. 	  
	   31 
Figure 2. Image of the 1995 accession of the Eftan countries
 
Source: BBC News (2014) 
 
1.7 The 2004 Enlargement  
Despite each enlargement’s significant contribution and impact to the 
formation and progression of the European Union, the enlargement that 
produced the most transformative change is that of 2004. Today, it is by far, the 
most critiqued and examined by scholars and politicians. Welcoming in the 
countries of Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the 2004 enlargement is the largest enlargement to 
date. This enlargement is momentous for two reasons: 1) the Eastern European 
countries that joined vastly differed culturally from EC member states; and 2) 
this enlargement enacted seven-year labor restrictions for countries that chose to 
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initially reduce their membership benefits, displaying a major attempt to 
integrate new member states into the EU, without acquiring economic or political 
damage.  
In an attempt to maintain economic stability in the Union and integrate 
new Member States, all but three (the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden) EU 
countries imposed labor restrictions on the 2004 Enlargement states. These labor 
restrictions account for the specific migration patterns evident in the mid-to-late 
2000s. Since EU countries like Italy, Germany, and France imposed labor 
restrictions on the 2004 countries, Eastern European migrants were more prone 
to move to places like Britain, where they were given rights to work almost 
instantly. It is this decision, on the part of these three countries, that would 
forever change the course of EU member state relations and public opinion 
toward intra-EU migration across all of the EU. The labor restrictions, instituted 
on the part of every other EU country, were not completely effective; these 
migrants did gravitate toward countries like Italy and Spain, where illegal work 
relationships were prevalent. Coupled with increased tensions in the east, this 
brought trouble to the border countries that saw an increase in asylum and 
refugee migrants.72 Still, the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the 2004 
enlargement holds serious implications for the EU project for “ever closer 
union”. More on this will be discussed from a cultural standpoint in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 3. Image of the ten Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004
 
Source: BBC News (2014) 
1.8 Expansions Today  
In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed and Bulgaria and Romania 
became EU member states. The Treaty of Lisbon’s main purpose was to improve 
several facets of the EU: increasing the power of the European Parliament, 
amending the voting process, and expanding the democratic functions of the EU. 
In doing so, it also sought to discuss the power balance between individual EU 
member states and the EU as a whole – an issue still being addressed today. Six 
years later in 2013, Croatia joined the European Union. Currently, Croatia is still 
under labor restrictions; therefore its impact, as a member state, cannot be fully 
assessed. Still, it exemplifies yet another enlargement of the EU to the east. What 
these two most recent enlargements show is that complication of the EU goal to 
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be “united in diversity” has only increased, as efforts to keep pro-nation state 
supporters at bay continues to prove difficult. The inclusion of Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Croatia dare us to ask the questions: how big is big enough, and 
how free is free enough? 
Figure 4. Image of the European Union today, as it stands with 28 member states 
 
Source: BBC News (2014) 
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Figure 5. Image of candidate countries for future admission to the EU
 
Source: BBC News (2014) 
 
2. What is Free Movement? 
 
 The free movement principle is a fundamental privilege bestowed upon 
each European Union member state. It is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the 
most unique inter-state relationship across the globe. Free movement is what 
Arendt (1958) calls the “right to have rights” and what other scholars refer to as 
the “bedrock of the European common market.”73 Although the essence of free 
movement is to provide “unfettered movement of capital and goods”, the social 
and cultural factors of free movement go hand in hand with the economic 
benefits.74 This is why it is crucial to evaluate the components of free movement. 
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Outlined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union75, 
the Article on free movement reads: 
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the 
Union. 
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member 
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
work and employment. 
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this 
purpose; 
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in 
accordance with the provisions governing the employment of 
nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action; 
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been 
employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be 
embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission. 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the 
public service. 
 
Article 45 discusses free movement as a freedom with regards to labor 
rights, again in reference to the EU’s goal of facilitating economic 
cooperation. Yet this principle cannot solely be impactful economically. It 
has massive implications for governing structures as well; free movement 
shifted power from the states to the EU and changed the rhetoric on politics 
of mobility and belonging.76 Free movement can be advantageous for EU 
nationals living and working in another EU country, as well as their family 
members, while also challenging national representation and understanding 
of migrants. Most importantly, the extent of free movement goes far beyond 
its ability to offer employment opportunities to the citizens of EU member 
states. Free movement also allows individuals to strengthen familial ties, 	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allow students the opportunity to study abroad, grant improved retirement 
benefits, and assist member state citizens to weather economic crises. It is an 
expansive freedom that sets the EU story of migration apart.  
 According to the studies conducted by the European Commission 
(2015)77 in Frankfurt, Leeds, Milan, and Rotterdam, the free movement of 
workers presents several challenges and opportunities. Integration must 
occur not only in the labor market, but also at the community level. These 
studies reveal that EU workers are a diverse subset of the labor force, both 
socioeconomically and culturally. Although EU workers benefit the 
economy by “bringing in entrepreneurial energy, purchasing goods and 
services, and helping to revitalise the housing market,”78 mass movement of 
migrants also presents housing challenges and imposes financial pressure 
on local services. The study does make clear that the perception that EU 
workers relying heavily on local services is much more pronounced than the 
reality of their use.79  
 The pattern of free movement has predominately been affected by 
seven enlargement dates. Free movement has also been relevant during 
periods of economic turmoil in Europe and across the globe. According to 
Benton and Petrovic (2013)80, particular characteristics of EU enlargement 
can be seen prior to the 2004 enlargement of Eastern European countries 
(pre-enlargement), in the post-enlargement period of the 2004 enlargement, 
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and during the economic crisis. As mentioned above, no enlargement has 
garnered the same level of attention and influence as those of 2004. For this 
reason, the sheer distribution of the 2004 enlargement reaffirms the notion 
that the salience of intra-EU migration is dependent on the volume of 
migration and the kind of member states admitted.  
Between 2004 and 2008, two particular shifts occurred in the movement of 
citizens of new member states moving to live in the EU-15 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom): thousands of Polish 
and Baltic citizens migrated to Britain and Ireland, while Romanian and 
Bulgarian citizens moved to Spain and Italy. For governments like that of Britain, 
the sheer volume of migrants came as somewhat of a shock, underestimating by 
90,000 the EU migrants it received.81 Due to the 2008 economic crisis, the most 
evident shifts of migrant patterns came to be seen from Greece and Spain to 
Germany. This shift continues to be clear today. 
The history of EU enlargements sets the stage for dissecting the 
various elements of intra-EU migration: the importance of economic 
development, the challenges of cultural inclusion, the political arguments 
that have formed around the free movement principle, and the unique 
relationship Britain shares with the EU. Each EU enlargement has brought 
new challenges and concerns to the Union, continuing to question how the 
benefits of free movement and inclusion of new countries to the European 
Union may alter the phenomenon of this politico-economic union. Just as 
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Martin Ruhs (2015) 82 has posed in his book and blog “The Price of Rights”: 
can and should free movement in the EU movement be reformed to offer 
unrestricted labor migration policy, whilst still maintaining an inclusive 
welfare market or do the benefit of intra-EU migration outweigh the costs 
(Ruhs 2015)? The following chapters seek to answer these questions through 
their respective economic, cultural, and political lens.  
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Chapter Two 
Labor Mobility and the Economic Impact of Intra-EU Migration 
 
 As previously discussed, the European Union’s raison d'être, in essence, is 
to display an ability to function more effectively in an economic capacity, 
together as member states, rather than apart. For decades now, politicians and 
public figures on the right have made forceful arguments for why the free 
movement of EU citizens, and of international migrants for that matter, hinders 
economic growth. They have encouraged anxiousness among EU citizens and 
have affected the media’s portrayal of free movement in the EU. On the other 
hand, economists and individuals who favor economic integration in the EU 
champion the notion that diversifying the labor market will strengthen EU 
member state economies as a whole. 
 This is how the free movement principle was born. As stated by 
Brauninger (2014)83, “from a macroeconomic point of view, open labour markets 
are a precondition for the efficient use of labour and thus a major instrument to 
foster growth and employment in Europe.” At the same time however, economic 
crises can cause shifts in migration trends. For example, it has caused increased 
east-west migration and migration from the periphery to the core member states. 
These events have become commonplace for countries like France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. In addition to this, there are two aspects of the relationship 
between the economy and intra-EU migration that are said to be true: 1) 
economic factors relate to why people migrate in the first place, and 2) economic 
integration of the EU has had a pronounced difference on a member state’s given 
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labor market, which then precipitates fears on the part of citizens, regarding the 
lasting effects of intra-EU migration and how it could affect their labor markets. 
The economic argument against further intra-EU migration and expansion of the 
Union is one of the strongest obstructions to furthering the goal of EU 
integration. Thus, it is fitting to begin discussing this factor, before delving into 
the possible cultural and political aspects of intra-EU migration. Despite such 
passionate debate and discussion that claims EU migrants steal jobs and hurt 
member state economies, scholarly analysis largely contradicts this, claiming that 
EU citizens do not negatively affect the member states to which they migrate. In 
fact, data shows quite the opposite. Yet despite this, the economic evidence 
proven by the scholars does not sway Eurosceptic individuals. Recognizing the 
contention that exists between these two sides, and understanding the economic 
analysis of several scholars will allow us to see how the economy impacts EU 
migration, and later on, look to provide evidence for whether or not these factors 
serve to further advance or impede the goals of “ever closer” union. 
More specifically, it is most relevant to the goals of this thesis to 
understand how the UK is affected by the economic impacts of intra-EU 
migration. As indicated in Chapter 1, and to be further bolstered in Chapter 4, 
the UK (Britain, in particular) has had significantly different experiences with 
intra-EU migrants, given the sheer number of migrants it has welcomed in and 
the political and cultural backlash it has created. Even more so, the fiscal effects 
of intra-EU migration on the UK are important to identify because they often 
contradict the personal views of many UK citizens. Several scholarly studies on 
the UK itself point to the positive contribution EU migrants make, as a result of 
their migration decision. Despite this publicly available data, few efforts have 
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been successful at challenging the viewpoints of politicians, public figures, and 
EU citizens.  
 In this chapter, I will discuss the levels of EU migration, particularly as 
they pertain to the EU enlargements. Doing so will demonstrate where EU 
migrants have chosen to migrate to over time, as well as which periods of time 
have lent themselves to particularly large movements of migrants. Then, I will 
analyze and summarize several economic arguments, as presented by prominent 
scholars to illustrate how EU migrants contribute positively to the member states 
and labor forces in which they migrate. It will not be my intention to create or 
pose any new understanding of the economic implications of intra-EU migration 
in this chapter. Rather, I wish to concisely aggregate the data currently available 
on intra-EU migration to exhibit the strongest possible argument in favor of the 
positive economic contributions made by EU migrants and to contribute to the 
understanding that economic factors have caused the backlash to intra-EU 
migration. 
 
1. Migration Trends throughout EU enlargements 
 1.1 Pre and Post the 2004 Enlargement 
The presence of EU migrants is not unique to the last decade. What is 
unique, however, is the increased presence of migrant groups since the 2004 
enlargement. It can be viewed as partially responsible for triggering fears about 
the national economy, politics, and culture. As echoed by Bela Galgoczi, Janine 
Leschke, and Andrew Watt (2011)84, “in the accession countries, ‘free movement’ 
was seen unanimously as a fundamental right. In the EU-15 countries, accession 	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was preceded by intensive and at times controversial debates about likely 
immigration flows and whether countries should immediately open up their 
labour markets fully, permitting unhindered labour mobility, or whether existing 
restrictions should be maintained for the foreseen transitional periods.”  
Migration statistics, while varying from one index to the next index, 
typically quantify the movement of migrants to and from EU member states. This 
is done, in particular, by looking at net migration, or the difference between the 
number of migrants that come into and out of the country. Migration statistics 
can also be interpreted in terms of migrant stock, or the percentage of migrants 
residing in a given state. Using the NINo, or National Insurance Numbers, which 
are allocated to all migrants in the UK, can also demonstrate where migrants 
typically come from and how many arrive. For example, in 2013, net migration to 
the UK increased by 20% from 2011. In addition to this, NINo data demonstrates 
that the number of migrants grew from the years 2012/2013 to 2013/2014. The 
populations of migrants with some of the highest numbers were seen for 
Romanians (+63%), Italians (+28%), Poles (+12%), and Portuguese (+11%).85  
Each enlargement, since the founding of the European Union, has seen 
migration to and from each member state. Levels of migration were fairly modest 
during the first four enlargements, following the founding of the European 
Community. The period following 2004, however, has presented significant 
trends in the role EU migration has played in the EU. No longer moderate, EU 
migration accelerated after 2004, leading to the development of three main eras 
of free movement: 1) the period prior to 2004, 2) the period following the 2004 	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enlargement, and 3) the period since the economic crisis, experiencing a east-
west shift in labor mobility.86  
 In the period prior to the 2004 enlargement, the main destination countries 
for work were Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Prior to 2004, 
there was a relatively stable number of Eastern European countries like Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechia present in the EU. For example, Germany had 
approximately 317,600 Polish migrants. Post 2004, these numbers exponentially 
grew. Between 2004 and 2008, Benton and Petrovic (2013) claim that the number 
of citizens living in the EU-15 increased by more than one million people. 
Specifically, these increased flows were seen in countries like the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, which received large migrant populations 
from Romania, Poland and other Baltic countries.87 
In 2010, six years after the 2004 enlargement, three years after the 2007 
enlargement, and before the accession of Croatia, EU migrants represented 35% 
of the total migrant stock in all EU countries. For some countries, like 
Luxembourg, Ireland, and Czechia, migrants accounted for well over 70%. Still, 
for some powerhouse member states of the EU, such as Germany, the UK, and 
France, the total migrant stock exceeded 25%. Specifically, for Germany, 
migrants in 2010, represented 3.7 million of the population. The UK, on the other 
hand, accounted for 2.2 million of the population.88 In order to understand what 
kind of migrants denote the largest proportion of such migrant stocks, we can 
refer to The World Bank, which in a 2010 study, reported that the largest ethnic 
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groups of people living in other EU member states are the Romanians, Poles, 
Italians, and Germans. When considering British citizens who live abroad, the 
largest population of Britons in 2010 could be found in Spain, Ireland, France and 
Germany – or in other words, other relatively economically prosperous EU 
countries.89  
Figure 6. EU migrants in each EU country, 2010 
	  
Source: The World Bank 
 
1.2 Migration Flows to and From the UK 
 As stated, previously, the sheer movement in the number of intra-EU 
migration in the 2004 enlargement was the catalyst for increased social tensions 
in the EU: “the most important consequences of eastern enlargement has been 
the full or partial opening up of national labour markets to citizens of the other 
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member states, not just within the – relatively homogenous – 15 ‘old’ member 
states, but for the entire EU of 25 countries.”90 This opening up of migration is 
credited with causing the spike in xenophobia, for economic, cultural, and 
political reasons, throughout the European Union (this is only further heightened 
by the presence of non-EU migration). Particularly, it is worth exploring the large 
number of migrants to the UK, a phenomenon not evident among all EU member 
states.  
Figure 7. Number of EU-born in the UK, 1993-2015 
	  
Source: Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey 
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2. Fiscal Impact of Intra-EU Migration 
 The financial impact, which results from intra-EU migration, takes into 
account an array of factors. When considering the position of migrants, it is 
important to distinguish between migrants to certain EU countries and the 
citizens born in their respective EU countries, specifically in regards to age, 
employment type, and level of education. Perhaps more importantly, it is 
necessary to understand that low economic contribution is not necessarily 
correlated with increased dependency on welfare benefits. Rather, low fiscal 
contribution is more closely related to low levels of income, which is not 
necessarily a characterization of migrants. Migrants are mostly young, with high 
levels of education that seldom rely on welfare benefits compared with their 
native counterparts. This is particularly true for the 2004 EU migrant groups.91 
Migrants are also more likely to be over-qualified for the jobs they perform, tend 
to be engaged in temporary or part-time employment, and are predominantly 
female.92  
 The member states that joined the EU during the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements heightened the relevance of understanding the economic impact of 
EU migration, specifically amidst a global financial crisis. As echoed by the 
European Citizen Action Service (2014)93, “social expenditure (including old-age 
pensions) takes more than half of all government spending in most EU countries. 
As a share of GDP, it has gradually grown to exceed 30%.” Such evidence 
demonstrates that in times of economic distress, the overall share of social goods 	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go up, which may be enough to further depress a country’s economic standing. 
For example, during the period between 2005 and 2012, Germany and Austria 
were able to keep their social expenditure levels fairly consistent. Conversely, 
levels of social expenditure for the UK and the Netherlands grew between the 
years 2005 and 2012.94 Welfare migration is particularly problematic for Britain 
since the 2004 enlargement. Migration flow from Eastern European member 
states to Britain, while larger than expected, was a direct response to the increase 
levels of social expenditure. Prior to 2011, economists predicted that the 2004 
enlargement would introduce 5,000 to 3,000 migrants to Britain. Instead, in 2011, 
521,000 Polish-born individuals migrated to Britain.95 Many Bulgarian and 
Romanian migrants, too, came in larger numbers to Britain. While both 
populations are relatively poor, studies by economists show that migrants, being 
young and able for employment, actually serve as net economic benefits, paying 
“more in taxes than they collect in tax-supported benefits.”96 
 
2.1 Fiscal Impact of EU Migration in the UK 
 Still, the fear that EU migrants are likely to hurt, rather than help, member 
state economies, has resonated strongly with Britain. In particular, it has caused 
Britain to reform its migration laws, denying unemployment insurances benefits 
for the first three months that EU migrants are in the country.97 Similarly, it 
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caused the UK to institute a policy where EU migrants needed to reach a certain 
salary threshold in order to be eligible for British welfare benefits.  
 The fiscal costs and benefits of intra-EU migration, particularly in regards 
to the A8 countries (i.e. eight of the ten Eastern European countries which joined 
the EU during the 2004 accession, excluding Cyprus and Malta), have been 
widely discussed by economists Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini. 
According to Rob McNeil, Head of Media and Communications at the Migration 
Observatory of the University of Oxford, it is Dustmann’s publications for the 
British government, which convinced government officials that it should not 
impose labor restrictions in 2004. 
In several of Dustmann and Frattini’s studies individuals from A8 
countries are largely characterized as a younger and better-educated cohort of 
people, in relation to the native UK population. The British Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), which surveys 53,000 households each quarter, determined that 32 percent 
of A8 men and 40 percent of A8 women are highly educated; by highly educated, 
the LFS means these individuals have left their academic studies at age 21 or 
over. This compares to 18 percent of native men and 16 percent of native 
women.98 The additional numbers that aim to show that the economic 
contribution of A8 individuals have not hindered economic growth in the UK or 
impeded on the labor force endeavors of UK citizens bolsters these facts. For 
example, Dustmann et al (2010)99 claim that A8 migrants are 59 percent less likely 
than natives to receive state benefits and 57 percent less likely than natives to 
rely on social housing. 	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While debatable, and deserving of some exploration, these statistics 
represent the existing disconnect between how migrants economically affect the 
labor force in which they become a part of and the mainstream response from 
UK citizens: “the belief that immigrants ‘take out’ more than they ‘put in’ is 
reflected in responses in questions in surveys of public attitude: according to the 
2002 European Social Survey, 57 per cent of the UK population believed that 
immigrants were taking more out of the welfare system than they put in, while 
only 11 per cent thought that immigrants were net contributors”.100 In an analysis 
of welfare dependency, and when controlling for the limited information 
provided for in the Labour Force Survey, A8 migrants who have been in the UK 
for at least 2 years are said to be 19.5 percentage points less likely to receive 
benefits and tax credits than their fellow natives.101  
These perceptions of A8 migrants are debunked in the Labour Force 
Survey, especially when considering the employment rate. The fiscal impact of 
the 2004 enlargement provided the creation for the Worker Registration Scheme 
(WRS), a database that tracked all A8 workers within the first 12 months of their 
employment. According to data taken from the Labour Force Survey, A8 
countries, as a proportion of the UK population, increased from 0.01 percent to 
.09 percent between the second quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2009. The 
proportion of A8 countries represented in the UK only continued to grow more 
strongly over the course of 2009. Descriptive statistics for the years 2004-2008 
suggest that for A8 migrants, approximately 90 percent of men and 74 percent of 
women factored into the UK employment rate; this compares with 	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approximately 78 percent for native men and 71 percent for native women.102 
Despite such employment rates, A8 migrants are still prone to lower wages than 
their native co-workers. 
In another study by Dustmann and Frattini (2014)103, again focused on 
supporting the claim that EU migrants are positive economic contributors to the 
UK, these economists make this claim by tracking the UK economy since 1994 up 
through the 2004 enlargement (up to 2011). In doing so, we can more robustly 
prove that EU migrants, specifically those from Eastern and Central Europe, 
have progressively contributed to the UK labor force. In the period from 1995-
2011, EEA immigrants were said to contribute 10% more than British citizens. 
Much of this can be due to the fact that migrants bring useful social and 
educational skills to the UK labor force. Most interestingly, Dustmann and 
Frattini (2014)104 found that “between 1995 and 2011 European immigrants 
endowed the UK labour market with human capital that would have cost 14 
billion pounds if it were produced through the British education system.” While 
these studies undoubtedly make several assumptions in regards to the children 
of immigrants and their future contribution to the UK labor force, it is 
undeniable that migrants to the EU do play a pivotal, positive role in their 
economic contributions over time.  
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2.2 The Issue of Welfare Benefits  
 A central reason why many individuals are opposed to the free movement 
of labor is due to the reality that welfare benefits, such as health care services, are 
available to migrants. “Welfare tourism”, a fear for many EU citizens, is the 
notion that migrants choose to move to another EU member state primarily to 
obtain welfare benefits. Under this rationale, migrants do not make a net positive 
contribution to the country in which they migrate. Despite this, many scholars 
like Remeur (2013)105 make clear that “using entitlements deriving from free 
movement cannot be seen as an abuse….neither economic reasons nor failure to 
comply with formalities can be grounds for expulsion and exclusion.” Remeur’s 
statement is bolstered in research by Wadsworth (2014)106 who showcases that for 
the UK and Germany, migrants use health services at the same rate as native-
born populations. This is particularly relevant, given the fact that EU migrants 
are, on average, a younger subset of the population. 
 
3. A Demographic Issue: Re-evaluating Free Movement 
Yet, despite the analysis of various studies, which prove that EU migrants are 
positive contributors to the states in which they migrate to, politicians on the 
right consistently believe that the benefits of the free movement of labor do not 
exceed the costs, be it economic or social. In an article in The Economist, Theresa 
May, the Home Secretary of the UK, was quoted as saying, that “there is no case, 
in the national interest, for immigration of the scale we have experienced.” Her 
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opinion, which is similar to that of many British politicians, is not validated by 
studies like that of Dustmann and Frattini, which says that between 2001 and 
2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area contributed one-third more 
in revenues than were taken for public spending.107 This information is only 
further strengthened when considering the ageing of the British population and 
the fact that such migrants would ease the “growing reliance on state health care 
and pensions.”108 Even more so however, the opinions of individuals like Theresa 
May give light to the idea that the contention regarding EU migration may not be 
economically induced. In the following chapters, I make the argument that the 
backlash to intra- EU migration appears to be culturally or socially induced. 
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Chapter Three 
Including Eastern Europe: Cultural Implications Since 2004 
 
In 2005, Emanuele Ottolenghi, a political scientist and Senior Fellow for 
the Foundation of Defense of Democracies made this statement about European 
identity: “a united Europe is not far from becoming reality. A European identity 
that transcends the national identities of Europe’s member states, however, is 
still a distant dream.”109 Ottolenghi was not wrong in his critique of European 
Union integration; while enlargements and globalization have pushed EU 
countries closer together, the respective identities of the EU nation states, despite 
being threatened, have not budged. 
Cultural integration substantially impacts the EU member state 
relationship. Politics and economics aside, cultural issues that engulf the EU 
truly determine to what extent the EU can remain a union that champions, rather 
than undermines diversity, as it is less malleable than economic or political 
differences. Historical data have showcased that the story of intra-EU migration 
within the European Union is a dynamic one; while the economic impact of 
intra-EU migration has consistently been calculated, support for and against EU 
integration and the cultural effects of EU integration are not as quantifiable. 
Cultural differences are a significant source of intra-EU conflict; at the 
same time, the increasing diversity of the EU does encourage the goal of “ever 
closer union,” and thus while contentious, can provide benefits. Scholars, 
economists, and politicians have meticulously dissected the cultural shift that 
took place during the 2004 Enlargement, which later continued in 2007 with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid. 	  
	   55 
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania and in 2013 with the entrance of Croatia. The 
2004 Enlargement is not only recognized as the largest expansion of the EU to 
date, but also remembered as the most culturally impressionable, given that the 
EU was primarily a cohort of Western European states prior to 2004. This was the 
year that Eastern European states joined the EU. Given the distinct differences of 
Eastern European countries, which differs greatly from that of Western European 
states, it is apparent that 2004 intensified the relationship between intra-EU 
member states by embracing countries that have faced different economic 
challenges, histories, political systems, and cultural customs. Having experienced 
few cultural challenges in prior enlargements, 2004 pushed member states to fear 
the growing power of the EU, many reverting to a stronger pro-nation state 
sentiment. In more ways than one, 2004 operated as the test for whether or not 
the EU could navigate a union of diversity.  
The cultural complications that have emerged, especially since the 2004 
enlargement, are reinforced by several important facts in the intra-EU migration 
story. First, the arrival of EU migrants was never envisioned as a permanent 
process: unlike what most EU countries expected to witness, data shows that 
migrants mostly move with the intention to stay; today many migrant families 
have remained in their respective European countries for two or three 
generations, constructing a situation in which cultural change can, indeed, 
occur.110 This finding suggests that migrants do not simply move with the 
intention of utilizing another EU member state’s labor market; rather, many 
embark on a permanent migration, transporting elements of their own customs 	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with them. Second, the decline in fertility rates in Europe has led to a 
demographic deficit, as emigration of new EU member state migrants is partially 
filling the deficit. With a decline in European birth rates, countries have little 
choice but to hire from outside of the EU, or from Eastern Europe, where many 
migrants are willing to work in lower skilled jobs and for a lower pay. Whilst 
both of these trends have serious economic implications on the EU, both 
phenomena are grounded in a bourgeoning cultural change. 
While economic impact is a not the singular factor that helps to facilitate 
contentiousness between EU member states, it does help explain why countries 
are driven to feel less positive towards the idea that compliance with the EU may 
lead to the diminishment in power of the nation state. As Aaron Andreason 
(2011)111 argues “economic downturns…make it harder for countries to cooperate 
with one another, since during economic hard-times the very diverse nations 
which make up the EU may start to look out for their own interests and become 
more protectionist as concerns regarding national sovereignty will reassert 
themselves”. If countries feel threatened economically, they will be even less 
willing to compromise over cultural values. The shift to prioritize the interests of 
the nation state is strengthened when countries sense that their customs and 
identity are being challenged.  
Economic implications aside, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the cultural 
piece of the intra-EU migration story is less transparent – and possibly a larger 
piece to understanding how intra-EU migration has affected the inter-member 
state relations. While economic discourse on intra-EU migration largely 	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showcases how the EU single market and free movement principle encourage 
economic productivity throughout the EU, cultural changes due to intra-EU 
migration are mostly regarded as a cause for inter-member state conflict, 
showing little progress for embracing European integration. Each EU member 
state has experienced intra-EU migration differently, but most have not felt that 
the inclusion of different cultures has benefitted the nation states; irrespective of 
the economy, the issue of culture remains a reason why most member states’ 
publics endeavor to identity primarily with their nation state, instead of with the 
European Union. Despite the EU’s hope, a passionate and resounding acceptance 
of EU pride has been hard to come by. 
In this chapter, I look to address how culture plays a role in inter-member 
state relations, predominantly as it has driven EU member states away from 
championing an EU “united in diversity” with the manifestation of the 2004, 
2007, and 2013 enlargements. While most scholars and politicians believe 
economic factors to be the motivation for member states to prioritize the nation 
state over the EU, I argue that the cultural shift of the EU has played a larger role 
in creating the barrier to an “ever closer union”. I will begin by discussing how 
the 2004 Enlargement created a contentious relationship between EU member 
states, as it brought cultural diversity in the EU to the fore. Then, I will discuss 
how several factors have stalled the progress for “ever closer union” and acted as 
bastions for promoting cultural fears. Lastly, I will illustrate how the inclusion of 
diverse cultures in the EU has served as the catalyst for political instability 
within the last decade of the EU, by evaluating how countries such as Italy and 
Spain have dealt with cultural diversity, predominately as it has been produced 
by the inclusion of Eastern Europe.  
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1. Explaining the 2004 Enlargement 
In a Wilson Quarterly article published in 2001, European progress towards 
becoming “whole and free” after years of wars, revolutions, and genocides, was 
described by Martin Walker as “botched.” Even more so, since 2001 little 
progress has been made in coming to terms with whether or not the boundaries 
of the European Union would be determined by its boundaries with Russia or 
perhaps in terms of the European Union’s affiliation to Judeo-Christian religions. 
Each enlargement changed the nature of what the EU identity would mean and 
what the EU would represent. For Walker, the EU is “not yet a state, or a political 
actor so much as it is a process, constantly in the course of becoming. It defies 
conventional analysis, being simultaneously less and more than the sum of its 
parts.”112 While each enlargement supposedly helped serve a more “whole and 
free” EU, Walker echoed this sentiment regarding increased European 
integration: “the EU’s chosen task of bringing prosperity and stability to eastern 
Europe and the Balkans will be a costly and controversial mission for at least a 
generation to come.”113 The obstacles of this mission came to fruition during the 
2004 enlargement, as the overwhelming number of Eastern European migrants to 
the West became the catalyst for cultural contention.  
The 2004 Enlargement received Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the EU. Unlike 
every enlargement prior to 2004, the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 
form part what is referred to as Eastern Europe. Distinctive from Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe has had unique political experiences, given their history 	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as constituent republics of the USSR, and for some, religious ties to Islam and 
other non-Christian-Judeo religions. Specifically what the 2004 enlargement 
contributed to, which was little to nonexistent in the prior enlargements, was the 
installment of fear that increased crime and terrorism would become a reality for 
the EU. While not necessarily proven accurate, the inclusion of “distant cultures” 
may threaten national integration and certainly seemed threatening to Western 
Europe, as some of these cultures affiliate with Muslim or stereotypically Muslim 
practices. Anti-east sentiment, as it has been amplified in the political and public 
sphere, has further complicated the project for EU unity.114  
 
2. Assessing the increasing cultural backlash since 2004 
2.1 A Noneconomic analysis of the intra-EU story 
According to Lauren McLaren of the University of Oxford, as the EU has 
become a more popular destination to live in, the interests of these citizens on the 
role of the EU have increased as well; that said few studies draw attention to 
levels of support, for and against European integration.115 While economic 
analysis has purported that the liberalization of the EU market will undoubtedly 
create winners and losers (the losers being low-skilled, uneducated individuals), 
the intra-EU migration narrative is far more complex when evaluating 
noneconomic factors. Acceptance for the idea of the EU is more embraced among 
individuals who value improving democratic ideals and protecting the 
environment, while less so with individuals who feel that the economy is the 
issue they value the most. To bolster her claims, McLaren writes: “antipathy 	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toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive 
mobilization…but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures.”116 
Economists, too, know it to be true that noneconomic factors play a large 
role in how individuals react towards increasing intra-EU migration. According 
to a study by Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston (2007)117, cultural and ethnic 
differences fuel opposition to EU migration: “cultural and ethnic distance may 
severely hinder the social integration process, and this may be considered to 
induce social tensions and costs.” Both academics go as far to say that such 
hostility establishes itself in the kind of rhetoric politicians use to discuss intra-
EU migration, an idea I discuss further in Chapter 4. 
Cultural fear, and with it, a lack of attachment toward Europe, 
demonstrates itself in the results from Eurobarometer surveys that question 
citizens about their affiliation with the nation state and the European Union in 
general. In one such survey conducted for the years 1999 and 2005, citizens from 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Austria 
were asked: “in the near future, do you see yourself as (nationality) only, 
(nationality) and European, European and (nationality), or European only?”118 
The survey illustrates that on the whole, EU citizens have increasingly self-
identified with their nation state first, before identifying with being a European. 
Few reported feeling attached to Europe before their own nation state, a response 
that, once again, thwarts the progress towards “ever closer union”. 	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Figure 8. “Please tell me how attached you feel to…The European Union (%)” 
	  
Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 2015) 
 
While not pertaining to EU migrants specifically, other studies, as well 
have supported the notion, in reverse, that migrants are more likely to see 
themselves as members of the EU, rather than of the country to which they 
migrate. Marco Cinnirella and Saira Hamilton’s (2014)119 study explores how 
South Asians with British citizenship describe their affiliation with Britain and 
the European Union. The results in this study may align with the sentiments of 
Eastern European migrants who have made the “traditional” Western EU 
member states their homes. Cinnirella and Hamilton’s study asked South Asian 
Britons and white Britons to express to what extent they feel part of Britain 
versus part of the European Union and to determine how important the 
European Union is for the future of Britain. As predicted, the results of the study 
suggest that South Asian Britons manifest a higher European identity than white 
participants, possibly because South Asian Britons, unlike white Britons, do not 
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share a negative history with much of Western Europe.120 While not yet tested, it 
is possible that the same results would hold when comparing Eastern European 
and Western European citizens; Eastern European migrants to Western Europe 
may be able to express greater support for the European Union as compared to 
Western European citizens. It is, thus, even possible that the increased 
occurrence of intra-EU migration would make for a less Euroskeptic Europe, if 
intra-EU migration were to earn enough support. 
 
 2.2 Threats to European Integration 
 As I have described, multiculturalism, or the “uncritical acceptance of 
cultural diversity” has only grown more prevalent since the 2004 enlargement.121 
For many political leaders, the backlash multiculturalism has caused for EU 
member states only further points to its failures: “we fail to provide a vision of 
society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these 
segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our 
values,” said British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011.122 Although many of 
the EU’s largest member states, such as Germany, France, and Spain, have all 
become the homes for a large EU migrant population, none have truly embraced 
the assimilation of other EU cultures at home: “ethno-cultural diversity was 
tolerated, but within a restricted band and as cultural ‘ornament’, rather than as 
an integral feature.”123  
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By far, the largest threat regarding the cultural shift following the 2004 
enlargement is the degradation of the nation state. This is particularly seen 
through the lack of ability to entirely distinguish between national cultures and 
member state policies. This is because “the same people who fear such changes 
from minority groups living in the country…are very likely to fear similar 
changes resulting from the process of European integration.”124 Some academics, 
like Andrew Gould and Anthony Messina (2014)125 have questioned whether or 
not it is possible for EU identity to ever supplant national identity. While not 
likely in the foreseeable future, overwhelming identification with the EU over the 
nation state is difficult to come by for many EU citizens; in addition to this, it is 
difficult to even ascertain what “EU identity” refers to, as the EU incorporates a 
people who speak different languages, embrace different histories, and affiliate 
with different religious beliefs.  
This barricade to embracing a EU identity is also reinforced by “the 
tendency of a critical number of Europeans to perceive few, if any, meaningful 
distinctions among the many ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious groups that 
are defined as ‘the other’.126 This is especially true for Western Europeans, who 
generally identify few differences between the “economic” migrants and asylum 
seekers; this was corroborated in a study by Bromley, Curtice, and Given (2007)127 
which revealed that Scottish citizens felt equally threated by the inclusion of 
Muslims, Blacks and Asians, and Eastern Europeans. Such a mentality from 
Western European countries may suggest that an acceptance toward Eastern 
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European migrants, despite possibly being economically or politically positive 
contributors to the EU, if they are seen as potential threats to national culture.  
Without a lingua franca, or common language, member states continue to 
maintain hyper-diversity, despite the attempts at the EU level to unite member 
states; this is especially difficult given that there are over sixty indigenous 
regional or minority languages spoken across the EU.128 While a strong religious 
affiliation in Europe is less prevalent than it is in the Americas, the 2004, 2007, 
and 2013 enlargements showcased that “public accommodation of Islamic civil 
and religious practices has only further diminished the prospect that religion 
could ever play a central role in facilitating the emergence of a European 
identity.”129 Bhabha (1998)130 has similar sentiments: “Western Christianity no 
longer occupies an exclusive or even preeminent position in the heartland of 
Europe. Three in every 100 ‘European’ workers are third country nationals; the 
proportion of ethnic diversity is much higher if non-white citizens are included. 
As second- and third-generation immigrant populations become established 
within Europe, the look and sound of Europeans is changing.”  
Religious affiliation, too, is an obstacle for achieving European integration. 
While the European Union does not adhere to any particular religion, most 
traditional Western Europeans affiliate with the Christian religion. This differs 
greatly from Eastern European countries, some of which have larger Muslim 
populations: “with the fall of Communism, it is Europe’s Muslims who now 
straddle the deepest rift in European identity formation. Until asserted 
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otherwise, they are taken to represent a religious, cultural, and political 
worldview opposed to Europe’s own imagined traditions.”131 Similarly to Gould, 
Givens (2014)132 states that Muslims in Europe have become “more defined as a 
group rather than as part of their respective nationalities and ethnicities” 
becoming “the focus of restrictive immigration policies, punitive immigration 
measures, and citizenship tests designed to test for ‘antiliberal’ values”. 
 
3. Attitudes towards Migration: Some examples 
Throughout this chapter, I have sought to express how the 2004 
enlargement, and later the 2007 and 2013 enlargement’s, inclusions of member 
states with substantially different cultures than Western European member 
states, created an impediment for the progress towards an “ever closer union”. 
This is due to resistance, both from migrants who do not integrate themselves 
into the EU member state they migrate to and from member state governments 
that do not adequately foster integration programs and policies. In this final 
section, I use specific examples from four EU member states (Italy and Spain) to 
describe how the issues of identity and integration have shaped intra-EU 
migration. In doing so, I aim to underscore how individuals and groups in 
countries that are traditionally associated with the EU express sentiments of 
cultural fears throughout the most recent EU enlargements. A deeper analysis of 
this for the case of Britain will follow in Chapter 4. 
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3.1 Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain  
Italy and Spain are two countries that have experienced cultural conflicts 
with the occurrence of the 2004 enlargement, particularly with regards to 
Romanian migrants. According to Simon McMahon (2015)133 the Romanian 
population represents the second largest of migrants in the EU. They have made 
a significant impact on Southern Europe, however, where they have dominated 
the labor market in low-skilled labor, and affected national immigration laws. 
According to this literature, however, “what distinguishes the Romanians from 
the other large immigration populations in both countries, such as Moroccans 
and Albanians, is their accession in the EU in 2007 and the associated granting of 
a set of rights not afforded to third country nationals. Thus, despite…that the 
formal status of Romanian immigrants in both countries has changed…a certain 
‘stickiness’ has been visible in national responses to mobility from within the EU 
meaning that Romanians have not directly become legal insiders in Italy and 
Spain.”134 What McMahon suggests here is that EU membership is not enough to 
create a sense of community or identity within the EU. It is not a prerequisite for 
acceptance, nor does it automatically foster European integration. Still, without 
willingness to conform to a EU member state’s way of life and the assistance of 
EU countries to encourage integration it is plausible that cultural contention will 
prevail.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 McMahon, Simon. Immigration and Citizenship in an Enlarged European Union: The Political Dynamics of 
Intra-EU Mobility. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire  ; New York, NY: AIAA, 2015. 
134 Ibid. 
	   67 
3.2 Public Opinion in the European Union for 2015  
 According to a European Commission Eurobarometer survey that asks 
individuals: “in general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?” results suggested that 
opinions are relatively neutral, as compared to survey conducted in autumn 2014 
and spring 2015. Specifically, the autumn 2015 survey suggests that 37% of 
Europeans have a positive image of the EU, a 4-percentage drop from the spring 
2015 survey results.135 Furthermore, when looking at member states specifically, 
this “positive” image is more likely to be seen in EU countries like Romania 
(57%), Poland (55%), Ireland (54%), Lithuania (53%), and Croatia (51%). On the 
other hand, for countries like Germany and Czechia, the positive image of the EU 
has decreased in percentage points since spring 2015, an 11-percentage point 
drop in Germany, and a 10-percentage point drop for Czechia.136 
 The lessening in the EU as a “positive” image among Europeans is echoed 
through the European Commission’s survey on trust in national governments 
and parliaments in the European Union. The results from this survey suggest 
that since spring 2015, trust in national political institutions has decreased by 8-
percentage points. While trust in the European Union still remains higher, there 
has been an increase in individuals who do not trust the EU. The survey suggests 
that since spring 2015, the proportion of individuals who do not trust the EU has 
risen by 9-percentage points.137  
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Figure 9. “% – EU – Tend to Trust” 
 
Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015 
 
 Lastly, while immigration proves to be the main concern for European 
Union member states, immigration does invoke different feelings among the 
member states. One survey suggests that countries like Sweden (80%), 
Luxembourg (77%) and Finland (74%) have the most positive responses towards 
migration from other EU member states. Countries that have a majority citizenry 
with negative feelings towards EU migrants, on the other hand, are Czechia 
(56%), Greece (50%), and Italy (49%).138 These statistics generally conclude that 
migration is a key issue in the European Union, strongly correlated with the 
perception and attitudes people have of the European Union as a whole. At the 
same time, they also point to the geographical proximity of these countries, as 
Czechia, Greece, and Italy’s geographical position (on the water and near Eastern 
Europe) may be a cause for contention and animosity towards migrants.  
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Figure 10. Positive or Negative Feelings toward EU and Member States (% - EU)
 
Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015 
 
As explored through the examples of European member state’s reactions 
towards intra-EU migration, cultural diversity is very indicative of subjective 
wellbeing and such levels of wellbeing affect economic and political factors of 
intra-EU migration. In a (2014)139 paper, Simonetta Longhi measures overall 
satisfaction according to diversity of birth, ethnicity, and religion. What she finds 
is that where assimilation is low, life satisfaction is high; this holds true when 
measuring diversity in the UK, which suggests that white Britons living in more 
diverse neighborhoods have a lower life satisfaction. Longhi’s study, while only 
one of many, has serious implications for the inter-member state relations, and 
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serves to bolster this theory that cultural differences are a serious obstacle to the 
project for “ever closer union”.  
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Chapter Four 
The Case of Britain – Politics, Public Opinion, and Polarization 
 
 While the economic, political, and cultural salience of intra-EU migration 
has gained exposure across all Europe Union member states, no country has 
maintained quite as unique a relationship with the EU as has Britain. Although 
eight other EU countries have yet to join the Eurozone (i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden), Britain is certainly 
not the only EU country to have resisted widening the EU’s scope of power. 
Britain serves as a dominant force within the union, despite striving to maintain 
its unique political, economic, and cultural characteristics. Boasting the EU’s 
second largest GDP and a major receiver of EU migration, Britain is 
simultaneously a leader in EU affairs, whilst maintaining remarkable focus on 
fostering independence and self-growth.  
 Uniqueness aside, Britain’s vocal discourse and debate on intra-EU 
migration have garnered significant attention in the media. The issue is a 
contentious topic both for politicians and the general public. The sheer noise it 
has produced has contributed to its development of a referendum on Britain’s 
continued membership within the EU – a potentially divisive instrument for 
damaging the solidarity and cohesion of the European Union, which will be held 
on June 2016. All throughout Britain, from the city center to London’s ethnic 
neighborhoods and into the countryside, the implications of intra-EU migration 
on the nation state’s economy, politics, and cultural values have been seriously 
challenged. 
 Having joined the European Union during the second enlargement in 1973 
(along with Ireland and Denmark), Britain has risen to the top of Europe as one 
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of the European Union’s most economically successful countries, thus attracting 
EU migrants and immigrants, and students from all over the world. Most 
importantly, for the purpose of this thesis, the desirability on the part of EU 
migrants to live and work in Britain, and the British response to this, magnify the 
distinctive relationship between England and its member states. This 
relationship, which has grown more antagonistic overtime, aims to confirm that 
unlike other member states that have responded positively to the advantages of 
free movement throughout the European Union, Britain, on the other hand, in 
comparison to other EU countries, has demonstrated animosity towards intra-EU 
migration. This attitude, held widely by scholars, politicians, and citizens of 
Britain themselves, further distances Britain from the rest of the European Union.  
In this chapter, I aim to discuss the uniqueness of the British relationship 
with the European Union. I do so by briefly characterizing Britain’s relationship 
with the EU, examining the political system’s response to intra-EU migration by 
citing several political speeches, and demonstrating the importance of London as 
a space of concentrated diversity. Next, I outline the methodology behind my 
research trip to London in January 2016, where I conducted interviews with three 
academics from the University of Sheffield, University of Oxford, and National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research. During my time in London, I also 
explored the two ethnic neighborhoods of Ealing and Palmer’s Green in order to 
establish a “feel” for the ways in which migrants from Greece, Cyprus, and 
Eastern Europe have adapted, or lack thereof, to Britain. I draw conclusions from 
the aforementioned interview transcripts and visits to the ethnic boroughs in 
order to provide clarity on the British relationship with EU migrants, in the past, 
present, and future. Lastly, I discuss the British portrayal of intra-EU migration 
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in the media and according to public opinion polls to assess how the rhetoric of 
politicians and the inclusion of EU migrants to Britain have affected British 
citizens. Altogether, I analyze these concepts in order to gain a better 
understanding of Britain’s strong proclivity to hold tightly to mainstream British 
culture. 
 
1. Britain as a “unique” member state 
 
1.1 Country before Union 
 
The study of Britain brings forth a unique and challenging portrayal of 
globalization in the works as it functions within the European Union. As we have 
previously established, the European Union itself is a direct response to the 
forces of globalization. It is no novelty that “governments have ceded power to 
mobile financial capital, to cross-border supply chains, and to rapid shifts in 
comparative advantage” under the premise that economic growth and peace will 
follow.140 However, how a country chooses to manage globalization is not 
uniform across the European Union. This was recently shown in a response by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne in September 2015, where he 
claimed that Britain’s “ability to opt out of any EU quota system on sharing out 
refugees was proof of its advantageous membership terms.”141 Britain has 
notoriously positioned its economic needs before that of the EU, but in the 
discourse on EU migration, the economy is not the only thing at stake.   
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1.2 The City of London 
 It is a common misconception that the presence of multiculturalism in a 
city is a sign of a welcoming and accepting attitude towards migration; even 
more so, it is wrongly assumed that multiculturalism is akin to integration. Such 
misunderstandings are attached to the general public’s opinion of London. From 
a tourist’s perspective, London is highly multicultural, standing apart from 
historically more homogenous cities, such as Rome and Vienna. However, after 
extensive evaluation, the Eurosceptic attitudes being portrayed in the media by 
the public and political figures are evident by the existence of cultural boroughs, 
divided by ethnicities.  
More than eight million individuals live in London, a cosmopolitan city 
politically, economically, and culturally distinct from the rest of Britain itself. It 
was this multicultural vision I embraced of London, prompting me to decide to 
spend eight and a half months studying abroad there from September 2014 until 
June 2015. As a EU citizen of Italy, and a born American, London appeared to be 
the mecca of multiculturalism. This is what always left me surprised when I 
learned and experienced first-hand accounts of British animosity towards intra-
EU migration. 
Despite being a highly multicultural city that serves as the intersection of 
Britain’s growing EU migrant population, London’s neighborhoods are anything 
but integrated. Rather, they embody subcultures of other EU member states, 
expressing the ways in which these cultures have adapted (or not) to life in 
Britain and faced adversity amongst the ever-growing discourse of EU 
animosity. A different story is told anywhere between twenty minutes to an hour 
away from the city center in London’s thirty-three segregated boroughs. 
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Goodhart (1995) acknowledges such segregation in saying: “London is not the 
happily colour-blind multiracial city that many people imagine or that one might 
think from wandering around in the centre [sic] of the city.”142  
London boroughs, in particular, are the home of Britain’s Eastern 
European migrants. Their presence is so large that the 2011 Census recorded that 
over half a million individuals living in England and Wales are primarily Polish 
speakers, making Polish Britain’s second language.143 My personal experiences, 
first-hand interviews, and research have underscored is that the topic of intra-EU 
migration in Britain has multiple layers, where certain ethnic groups are more 
“unwanted” than others. 
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Figure 11. Image of London’s thirty-three boroughs
 
Source: London Government Directory 
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Figure 12. Top 10 countries of birth of migrants in London, 2014. 
	  
Source: Labour Force Survey, Q4 
 
2. Political Influences and Party Responses 
Now that we have discerned the characteristics distinct to Britain as a 
member of the European Union, it is necessary to analyze the way its politicians 
have framed the issue of intra-EU migration and served as an impetus for its 
Eurosceptic attitudes. Delving into the rhetoric put forth on intra-EU migration 
by individuals such as Prime Minister David Cameron, former Labour Party 
leader Ed Miliband, and UKIP Leader Nigel Farage can facilitate such an 
understanding.  
In several speeches delivered by David Cameron, the rhetoric is highly 
centered along supporting a controlled migration policy. In his 2015 speech 
following his victory in the parliamentary elections, Cameron spoke about 
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delivering security to British families, primarily in regards to the economy. 
Refusing to compromise on Conservative values, Cameron is adamant that 
Britain’s belief in both the nation state and free trade are why a strong Britain 
will make for a strong EU. Yet, just as Cameron refuses to compromise on 
conservatism, he also makes clear that Britain is different and will fight against 
EU policy with which it does not agree with: “believe me, I have no romantic 
attachment to the European Union and its institutions. I’m only interested in two 
things: Britain’s prosperity and Britain’s influence.”144 Cameron is clear what 
Britain seeks to achieve from its membership in the EU: a stake in the common 
market, not creating “ever closer union”. 
These ideas of commitment to the EU on an economic basis alone were 
reiterated in Cameron’s speech with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos 
Coelho in September 2015. Cameron references Britain and Portugal’s bustling 
economies in 2010, claiming that both have suffered economically since, urging 
that the EU do more to capitalize on the advantages of the single market system.145 
For him, this can only be realized with stronger nation state power and the 
diminishing the power of the European Union as an institution. UKIP Leader 
Nigel Farage and his supporters, too, are keen on expressing their distaste for the 
UK’s dwindling political representation at the EU level: according to a UKIP 
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article published in October of 2015, the UK does not hold a seat on the World 
Trade Organization.146  
Cameron’s speeches have only ever alluded to the importance of cultural 
diversity in reference to the economy; the rhetoric is based on the migrant ability 
to contribute to Britain economically, but his views on diversity, notwithstanding 
the economy, do not seem particularly positive. This differs from Labour Party 
Ed Miliband’s rhetoric on migration, whose speeches have discussed the 
importance of building a “shared society.”147 In Cameron’s speech in May of 2015, 
his rhetoric focused on cracking down on uncontrolled immigration, reducing 
the demand for skilled migrants by training citizens and minimizing the 
incentives to move to Britain, because “under free movement rules, national 
welfare systems can provide an unintended additional incentive for large 
migratory movements.”148 Eventually, all such desires on the part of David 
Cameron and the Conservative Party rest upon its ability to obtain 
comprehensive renegotiation with the EU.  
  
3. Neighborhood Case Studies Results 
  Before discussing the results from my London ethnic neighborhood visits, 
it is crucial to first grasp the key themes that justify why evaluating ethnic 
neighborhoods in London is so important. These themes are life satisfaction, 
minority representation, and integration. As referenced in my interview with 
Cinzia Rienzo, a discussion paper written on behalf of the Centre for Research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 “Lord Rose Deliberately Confused Europe with the Political Union That Is Called the EU.” UKIP. 
Accessed October 21, 2015. 
http://www.ukip.org/lord_rose_deliberately_confused_europe_with_the_political_union_that_i
s_called_the_eu. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
	   80 
and Analysis of Migration at University College London associates higher life 
satisfaction with individuals who tend to live in groups of their ethnic 
background.149 Thus, this may largely account for the reason why so many EU 
immigrant groups, such as the Greeks and Eastern Europeans, are highly 
concentrated in certain British neighborhoods; this is not particularly the case for 
other Western European groups and may go to show that certain ethnic groups 
are less capable of integration in Britain than others. Such lack of integration may 
also lead to disproportionate underrepresentation of minorities, as Messina 
(1987)150 portrayed in his case study on the London Borough of Ealing; the 
discovery that Ealing’s politicians were less involved and engrossed in minority 
concerns brings to light the fact that such separation breeds animosity, neglect, 
and disunity. 
 In this section, I will detail my personal experiences as I walked the streets 
of Ealing and Palmers Green. When visiting both neighborhoods in January of 
2016, I strived to capture how the ethnic population transformed the space and 
made it their own. In observing ethnic landmarks, such as churches, shops, and 
housing developments, I noted human interactions and compared my experience 
with that of living in central London. Lastly, I incorporated these observations 
with conversations I had with three British university academics (two of whom 
were born in Britain, one born in Italy). In doing this case study comparison, I 
hope to show not only the uniqueness of these ethnic neighborhoods, but also to 	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demonstrate how their relative exclusion from the mainstream of British life has 
furthered the air of mystery surrounding and animosity toward certain EU 
migrant groups.    
 
3.1 The London Borough of Ealing 
In an effort to seek out the residential concentration of one of Europe’s largest 
Polish communities, I proceeded to spend my first full day on my return to London by 
traveling to Ealing Broadway, the final stop on one of the Western branches of the 
Piccadilly Line. Ealing Broadway, located within the Borough of Ealing, is the center of a 
dominant Polish community in London. Approximately thirty-minutes outside of the 
central city, this borough transformed into “Little Poland” virtually the second I stepped 
foot outside of the Underground station. The surrounding streets bore the signs: 
advertisements for the “friendly” English language school down the street, a massive, 
ornate Polish Roman Catholic Church peaking above the trees, Middle Eastern and 
Turkish shops that covered the main street, and the hustle and bustle of Polish Londoners 
emerging from and entering into the main road shopping center. Alongside the main 
street of Ealing, I found the homes of many of these Polish Londoners; long rows of 
similarly-shaped houses, many marked with iron fences and stone gates were laid out in 
close quarters. Unlike the main shopping street, the neighborhoods were quiet, except for 
the soft murmur of Polish speakers in the background.  
Several of the landmarks I came across during my visit to Ealing serve as 
fundamental components to Ealing’s Polish culture. The Church of the Most 
Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of the Church is one of twenty-three Catholic 
churches in London and home to over 4,500 Polish-Catholic worshippers in the 
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Ealing community151. The epicenter of the Polish community, the church also 
functions as meeting space, coffee shop, and library. Ealing’s culture is also 
expressed through its eateries. Boasting around twenty-six Polish delis, like that 
of Parade Delicatessen. According to Piotr Stolarski (2016)152 of the Ealing Local 
History Centre, “as well as being places where you can buy Polish foodstuffs, 
Polish delis sometimes act as community hubs by displaying community 
information and classified adverts in their windows”. Lastly, Ealing residents 
boast maintaining their sense of culture through its school system. Ealing has 
several Catholic day schools and Polish Saturday schools which aspire to teach 
Polish language, history, literature, and the Catholic religion. These distinctive 
features permeate Ealing with a distinct Polish culture that cannot be found 
anywhere else in London.  
Albeit brief, my visit to Ealing provided me with an important 
understanding of the systematic way in which diversity functions in London: 
these large ethnic populations predominantly stay together, but consequently, 
this causes them to live at a distance from mainstream British life. My visit also 
revealed to me the power of ethnic neighborhoods. Unlike the city center, the 
borough of Ealing, a mere 9.6 miles away, depicts a life unlike that of London’s 
more bustling areas like Charing Cross, Piccadilly Circus, and Oxford Street. 
Ealing, on the other hand, is quieter, less ethnically diverse, and poorer than the 
heart of London.  
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My portrayal of Ealing, however, is but a snapshot in time, as Ealing’s 
past is drastically different than its present. Using the account provided by 
Jonathan Oates and Peter Hounsell, entitled “Ealing: A Concise History”, the 
Ealing in which I stepped foot during January 2016 is not the Ealing of the last 
few decades. In this recounting of Ealing’s history, Oates and Hounsell bring to 
life the transformation of the borough. Most importantly, however, what Oates 
and Hounsell capture is the demographic change and growing relevance of 
Ealing. While the residents of Ealing have been concerned with fostering a 
relationship with the central city since the 1300s, the modernization of 
transportation between central London and Ealing over the course of the 
centuries has greatly improved this endeavor. 
Ealing, which became a borough in 1901, is described in Oates and 
Hounsell’s account as a religious, peaceful, and pleasurable place to live. Ealing 
can also be distinguished by the relative wealth of its residents, which remained 
prominent prior to the rise in migration levels from Eastern Europe. Over the 
course of the centuries, Ealing maintained a thriving economy through the 
agricultural industry, as well as religious importance with the average resident, 
despite tensions existing between various Christian religious groups.153 In the 
mid-1900s, Ealing was proclaimed the “Queen of the Boroughs”, a title which 
insinuated it served as the best place to live in London. This was due to its 
expansion of housing opportunities, parks and other green spaces, shopping 
centers and proximity to the central city.  
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3.2 Palmers “Greek” 
 
On the Sunday morning of my trip to London, I rode the tube for approximately 
thirty-seven minutes from Charing Cross Station to Arnos Grove Station, followed by a 
twenty-five minute bus ride from the station to the center of Palmers Green. Arnos Grove 
is the nearest underground station to Palmers Green, an area popular with the Cypriot 
Greek community in London. Located in the London Borough of Enfield, Palmers Green 
is commonly referred to as “Palmers Greek” and its name certainly reflects its look and 
feel. Less populated and busy than Ealing, Palmers Green is highly residential, with long 
rows of “Greek-style” houses split by a main road used to transport residents by bus to 
the neighboring train and underground stations. Along the roads, families travel together 
and friends salute each other as they walk by. I even received a “good morning” greeting 
from two residents. Similarly to my experience in Ealing, my time in Palmers “Greek” 
was brief and provided me with insight about the nature of the relationship between the 
Cypriot Greeks and the British in London.   
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4. Images of London’s Ethnic Neighborhoods 
 
Figure 13. Photograph of English Language School in Ealing Broadway 
	  Source: Author’s photography 	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Figure 14. Photograph of a quiet ethnic neighborhood in Ealing Broadway
	  Source: Author’s photography 	  
Figure 15. Photograph of the main street outside of the Ealing Broadway tube station, lined by various 
ethnic shops and eateries 
	  
Source: Author’s photography 
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Figure 16. Photograph of the homes in Palmers Green 
	  Source: Author’s photography 
Figure 17. Photograph of the homes outside of the tube station in Palmers Green 
	  
Source: Author’s photography 
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5. EU Migrants in Britain: Public Opinion and the Media 
 The political discourse on intra-EU migration, coupled with my personal 
experiences and interviews, reveal the complex public opinion data related on 
the topic. In essence, the data showcases how the formation of ethnic 
neighborhoods often poses a direct challenge to white citizens, who once resided 
in these areas. In the case of Britain, this may be because ethnic neighborhoods 
are not well integrated in mainstream British life. In a journal article written in 
the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Robert Ford (2015)154 dissects British 
public opinion on intra-EU migration by presenting the issue as dependent on a 
migrant’s region of origin. This finding, in particular, relates to the inclusivity of 
the migrant groups I observed during my research trip, namely Eastern 
European groups and EU migrant groups from less economically stable 
countries, such as Greece. Ford’s analysis, primarily based on American ethnic 
identity research, showcases that similarly to Americans, Britons primarily 
choose to socialize with those who closely resemble them on a cultural, linguistic, 
and socioeconomic level.155 However, one main finding from Ford’s research is 
that opposition to migrants is not grounded in a competition for economic 
resources: “no political movement has ever mobilised in opposition to the 
settlement of Irish, European, or Australian immigrants”, but Eastern European 
migrant groups have faced negative reactions toward their settlement, in Britain 
specifically (Ford 2015).156 
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 In an effort to amass British opinions on the implications of intra-EU 
migration and the position of Britain within the European Union, I conducted 
three interviews with London academics. While these interviews cannot and do 
not reflect British public opinion in general and do not serve as representations 
of British politics, they do, however, illuminate the complexities of British public 
opinion, with each interview offering the nuanced interpretations of intra-EU 
migration. 
  
5.1 Scholarly Opinion: Dr. Cinzia Rienzo 
In my interview with Dr. Cinzia Rienzo of the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, I learned that Rienzo’s analysis of intra-EU 
migration was founded in the recognition that the sheer volume of 
multiculturalism in London, which is highly distinguishable from other regions 
in the UK, accounts for its more “open” and accepting” mentality toward 
migration. However, London’s attitude toward migration does not necessarily 
holistically reflect that of Britain. Political rhetoric claiming that EU migration is 
economically damaging to Britain is still a sound argument many are bound to 
believe. 
In an effort to dissuade the popularization of such economic arguments, 
Rienzo cites a paper she co-wrote, which appears in the Journal of European 
Labor Studies. In the paper, Rienzo and Vargas (2015)157 refer to banning non-EEA 
low-skilled migrants as causing a “balloon effect”, where the ban would prompt 
increased migration from high skilled migrants from outside of the EU. Rienzo 
declared, “if you start with the principle that England is looking to attract the 	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‘best and the brightest’, it doesn’t matter where the migrants come from” (Rienzo 
2016), but this is not necessarily what the UK Government believes. Rienzo and 
Vargas cite studies from the 2011 Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development to substantiate their findings: a survey conducted in 2011 of more 
than 1,000 UK employers claimed that 34% anticipated that they would recruit 
more EEA migrant workers to combat the government’s non-EEA migration 
restriction policies. This study was re-evaluated three years later in 2014, where it 
was found that 20% of the employers in the study actually recruited more EEA 
migrant workers.158  
Contrary to popular belief, Rienzo’s research has shown that Eastern 
European migrant men and women, particularly Polish women, are strong 
contributors to the British economy; this can be favorably compared to non-EU 
populations like Bangladeshi women, who have very low rates of employment. 
While a “sense of belonging” to mainstream British life is still hard to come by 
for many EU migrants, and higher rates of life satisfaction have reportedly been 
found among groups that choose to live with those who share their ethnicity, 
Rienzo claims that Britain is “coping well” and is “more prepared than other EU 
members” to handle diverse migrant populations and large volumes of 
migration.159 
Still, the perception of EU migrants among British citizens is still highly 
problematic; many believe that EU migrants are predominantly low skilled. 
Misconception of such facts has only further exploded due to tremendous 
political pressure on individuals, like Prime Minister David Cameron, Rienzo 	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says. In addition to this, since the public is only privy to a small selection of data, 
it is easy for the facts to be distorted. Rienzo exemplifies this finding in telling me 
about a study she created, which argued that EU migrants contribute more than 
British citizens to the national economy. This led to a Daily Mail article that 
interpreted her study by professing that EU migrants are stealing jobs from 
British citizens.160 
 
 5.2 Scholarly Opinion: Professor Andrew Geddes (University of Sheffield) 
 My interview with Professor Andrew Geddes of the University of 
Sheffield emphasized for me the importance of understanding the cultural and 
political challenges of intra-EU migration. To begin, Geddes expressed that 
“cultural conflict” in Britain has not been a predominantly physical occurrence; 
in fact, cultural conflict has mainly been precipitated by word of mouth: 
newspaper articles and politician speeches. Geddes argued that Britain has 
always championed the free market that is the objective under the free 
movement principle.  
 British support of the free market is thus crucial, according to Geddes, to 
understanding Britain’s position in the intra-EU migration discourse. A key 
advocate for the free trade of goods and services, Britain has endured a lifetime 
of migration from post-colonial immigrants. In the 1980s, England advocated for 
the free market system under the rule of Margaret Thatcher. This mentality 
stayed consistent through the European Union’s decision to enlarge in 2004 to 
ten Eastern European countries. According to Geddes, Britain saw EU expansion 	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into the East as an opportunity to form allies with these former Cold War states. 
Their accession was also occurring at a key moment in British history: its 
economy was growing, and the promise of increased labor migration through the 
2004 enlargement was highly favorable at the government level. In hindsight, the 
British government’s embrace of the 2004 enlargement is intriguing, given the 
migration outcomes it produced. In 2005, the enthusiasm for the mass movement 
of Eastern Europe migrants to Britain rapidly deescalated and with it, arose 
UKIP.161  
 The 2004 enlargement promoted cultural salience in Britain. While 
demographic change does not determine economics, it does have the power to 
change it. In our conversation, Geddes made clear that unlike the United States, 
Britain does not see itself as a “nation of immigrants”. Despite this, Britain does 
not hold animosity towards immigrants; many Britons have migrants in their 
families. In fact, Geddes believes that Britain is considerably more tolerant of 
ethnic groups than other countries, such as Italy, which has a predominantly less 
heterogeneous population.162 However, similarly to Rienzo’s comments, Geddes 
states British citizens generally place non-EU immigrants and EU migrants in the 
same category. It is only more fuel to the fire that the EU is under a global threat, 
an atmosphere of fear that has penetrated through the hearts and minds of 
British citizens and their political leaders.  
 Politically, Geddes characterized the voting decisions of the British 
citizenry in terms of increased support of UKIP and downfall of the Labour 
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Party, which has “left behind the working class.”163 Such former Labour 
supporters, many of whom have endorsed UKIP, represent the British subculture 
that fears neoliberalism and globalization; many have had first-hand experience 
with the crumbling job market or demographic change in their neighborhoods. 
Even the highly Eurosceptic Cabinet of David Cameron validates this anti-EU 
sentiment. This said, the possibility of the UK leaving the EU is “enormously 
destructive”, and the chances of a complete EU exit are slim.164 Just as EU 
migrants have benefited from working and living in Britain, so too have Britons 
enjoyed this benefit in the EU. Leaving the EU would require years of 
renegotiation on the part of Britain, as well.  
 
5.3 Scholarly Opinion: Rob McNeil (University of Oxford Centre of 
Migration, Policy, and Society) 
 
 In my final interview with Rob McNeil, Head of Media and 
Communications at the University of Oxford’s Centre of Migration, Policy, and 
Society (COMPAS), my research and discussions on Britain’s opinions of intra-
EU migration culminated in a discussion centered on media framing and the 
crucial role it has played in fostering anti-EU sentiments. Much like Rienzo and 
Geddes, McNeil cites the 2004 enlargement as a crucial shifting point in British 
politics, public opinion, and media portrayal of intra-EU migration.  
 Most importantly, my inquiries regarding the 2004 enlargement provided 
McNeil with the possibility to reveal to me a crucial, influential factor that 
further pushed the UK to support the accession of these ten Eastern European 	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member states: the scholarly contribution of economist Christian Dustmann at 
the government level. Dustmann, an esteemed scholar and economist, whose 
distinct economic findings support EU migration, which I cite in Chapter 2, 
played an important role in the British discourse on EU migration, circa the early 
2000s. According to McNeil, Dustmann helped shape policy in Britain by writing 
a report for the government in 2003.165 His insights, which were fundamentally 
grounded in the notion that EU migration is highly beneficial for the British 
economy, assisted in convincing the British government, at a time of high 
economic stability, that the 2004 enlargement would do nothing but support 
Britain’s fiscal and monetary status.  
 More specifically, Dustmann’s theory helped encourage the UK to become 
one of the three countries to refuse imposing labor restrictions on the new EU 
member states under the 2004 enlargement. His publication specifically stated 
that when EU expansion occurred, it would not create a large in-migration to the 
UK. This only amplified the confidence of the Labour Party under Tony Blair, 
which supposed that open border policies and a willingness to allow for such 
policies would provide economic benefits to Britain. However, despite 
Dustmann’s reputation and the sound arguments that have made him a notable 
scholar in the field of migration economics, his predictions for the impact of the 
2004 enlargement countries on Britain were profoundly inaccurate. EU migrants 
entered Britain in droves, and their arrival noticeably impacted mainstream 
British culture and the British economy. Therefore, this publication in 2003, while 
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not the sole reason by the UK’s decision-making policies, was divisive in its 
impact on the future of EU discourse on a political and local level.  
 McNeil’s exposure to the media and public opinion in his research also 
show that there is a distinction to be made between attitudes towards migrants 
and exposure of migrants. In other words, the presence of migrants does not 
necessarily mean that those exposed to migrants will adopt a more pro-EU 
approach to the migration discourse. McNeil proves this by outlining the 
political bent of British newspapers, claiming that the Times, Star, Telegraph, 
Sun, and Daily Mail are anti-European; the Independent, Mirror, and the 
Guardian are slightly more pro-EU; and the Financial Times and The Economist 
are pro-EU. The prevalence of right-wing newspapers only fuels “economic 
fears,” thus making it increasingly difficult for the average citizen to come to an 
informed opinion on EU migration. As McNeil claims, the “power and 
effectiveness of the media to engage in this issue is what creates the public 
opinion we see today.”166 
 McNeil’s findings establish the polarization of political parties in Britain. 
Do two polarized parties allow one to make an informed decision? For McNeil, 
the answer is no; rather, the decision-making is entirely contingent upon trade-
offs: what is it that Britons most want, a strong economy or diversity? It seems 
that both of these factors are not mutually exclusive.167 Such trade-offs, and 
decisions, like the evaluation of the EU referendum, are discussed in “emotional” 
terms, say McNeil, where the substantial evidence supporting or refuting the 
claim that EU migration is beneficial is lacking.  	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 The mass media has portrayed the contentious mass settlement of Eastern 
European migrant groups, like the Poles in a variety of ways. In a journal article 
on the ways in which Polish migration to the EU is discussed in UK newspapers, 
Jolanta Drzewiecka, Joshua Hoops and Ryan Thomas examine how different 
British newspapers frame the issue of intra-EU migration through their use of 
words such as  -“asylum seekers”, “immigrants”, “migrants”, and “refugees” – 
many of which were wrongfully used interchangeably.168 These British 
newspapers, which are highly partisan, have drastically different interpretations 
on the subject of intra-EU migration and specific migrant groups; these 
interpretations filter down to the readers, whose views on Britain and the EU are 
formed. 
 
6. What it Means to be British 
  As previously mentioned, London (and Britain on the whole) is racially 
diverse, but there is little real integration. In his research, Goodhart (1995)169 speaks 
of the concept of lived integration, a necessity for creating a more ethnically 
accepting Britain. Goodhart states his claim in saying: “this is about 
neighbourhoods and workplaces, about common spaces and language; it is not 
about being represented to ‘official Britain through your ethnic community 
leaders. It therefore depends on repeated interaction with the mainstream, 
something that is obviously harder to achieve if you live in an ethnic enclave 
immersed in the institutions of your own community.”170 Thus, to reintegrate what 
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I have previously proposed, an improved relationship between the nation state 
and migrants is necessary. 
  What Goodhart and other scholars who specialize on the topic of 
immigrant integration in Britain are getting at is that Britain’s areas of 
concentrated ethnic groups further distance EU migrants from British life. This 
only validates or reinforces political claims that such migrants are not fit for 
Britain, a sentiment that seeps into the public opinions of its citizens. What is 
troubling is the push and pull between British identity and EU unity, both of 
which appear to be seen as incompatible. Thus, to advance the understanding of 
this viewpoint, the guise of the European Union needs defining.    
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Chapter Five 
If They Become Us, What Will We Be? Assessing the Turkish 
Issue and Maintaining National Identity in an Integrated EU 
 
 In this thesis, I have endeavored to showcase how free movement of EU 
migrants has triggered supposed economic, political, and cultural turbulence. I 
have developed my argument around the phenomenon of the 2004 enlargement 
– a significant moment in EU history that brought forth issues of identity and 
cultural integration for European Union member states. While a unanimous 
decision stating which of these factors – political, economic, or cultural – is 
primarily responsible for causing popular resistance towards intra-EU migration, 
has not been made, one statement has continued to remain relevant over time: 
the diminishing power of the nation state and its inability to concretely 
characterize the European Union as a collection of states continue to push 
member states away from accepting enlargement and the integration goals of the 
EU. 
 This notion of increased enlargement begs the question: which 
country/countries are next to join the EU and when will the EU reach its optimal 
goal in serving as a union that champions diversity and remains economically 
successful? These questions preoccupy the minds of scholars and political 
figures, with many fearing any further enlargement towards the east. Although 
there are still several countries in Europe that have either refused or been denied 
EU membership, the fear of enlargement among the current member states is no 
stronger than that for Turkey – a country viewed as so different socially from 
that of the current EU member states. A country, whose social, economic, 
political, and cultural values have historically differed tremendously from those 
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of Western Europe, the potential inclusion of Turkey in the EU endures as 
possibly the most challenging reality for the future of the European Union. Up 
until the most recent enlargement in 2013, all EU member states have shared 
similar social goals, even despite the cultural differences that were present in the 
accession of the 2004 countries. 
 A Turkish entrance in the EU has the potential to challenge the political, 
economic, but mostly cultural values of the EU. By the same token, Turkey’s 
inclusion, in re-defining the European Union, could augment the EU’s political 
power and the role it plays in international relations in the east. While the 
enlargement of 2004, in which accession drove “the Central European states in a 
position where they had to adapt to EU legal rules rather than being able to 
develop genuine policy solutions to given problems” (Barnickel and Beichelt 
2013)171, a Turkish enlargement, given its size and influence, may in turn compel 
the EU to increase its own flexibility in creating policy to adhere to Turkey. 
Altogether, unlike the countries that joined in the prior enlargements, Turkey’s 
entrance into the EU would alter the social composition of the EU like no other 
enlargement before, as well as challenge the EU to recreate its identity. 
In this final chapter, I address the following questions: what does it mean 
to be a member of the European Union? What are the principles in which the EU 
is founded? What are the reasons for which EU citizens are more apt to articulate 
national pride, rather than pride for the European Union? I delve into these 
questions in order to gain insight into how the possible inclusion of Turkey to the 
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EU would affect the dynamic of inter-member state relations and their 
relationship with the European Union. In particular, I give special attention to 
Germany, an economic force in the EU to be reckoned with, which has 
experienced significant levels of Turkish migration. In doing so, I hope this thesis 
can more comprehensively determine what the various implications of intra-EU 
migration and member state relationships regarding EU migration are.  
 
1. Defining the values of the European Union 
 According to Pew Research Center, “belief that economic integration 
would strengthen national economies was the founding principle of what 
became the European Union.”172 Recent cultural conflicts since the 2004 
enlargement, and even more so now with the potential inclusion of even more 
diverse countries, such as Turkey, has led many European Union member states 
to look less favorably on what was once an institution they were proud to join. 
The EU is an institution primarily based on the intuition that member states can 
thrive together economically. Even more so, however, the EU prides itself on 
being an agglomeration of countries that champion democracy, civil liberties, 
primarily align themselves with Judeo-Christian values, and altogether have 
fairly similar goals for the future of the European Union. Unlike Turkey, with a 
large Muslim population and a semi-authoritarian regime, European Union 
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member states are quick to perceive a boundary between Turkey and 
mainstream Europe.173 
 
2. Potential membership for Turkey 
 2.1 Costs and Benefits 
 Turkish membership in the EU has gained high political salience over the 
course of the last two decades. Politicians from all over the European Union have 
met countless times to discuss the Turkish issue, including its merits and 
drawbacks. While not always clear, of Turkey’s geopolitical position in the 
world, its youthful labor market, sixty percent of which is under the age of 35, 
and its market size, can be viewed as potential benefits for the European Union. 
Neill Nugent (2007)174 even suggests that Turkey, as an Islamic state, may even be 
seen as a positive for the EU, providing the EU with clout to “encourage 
moderate Islamism, to help extend the EU’s ‘soft’ influence in other Islamic 
countries…and to demonstrate that Islam, democracy, and western capitalism 
can mix.” Yet, Turkey’s many attractive features as a potential member of the EU 
do not obscure its culturally contentious features. 
 The perceived social and cultural costs of admitting Turkey into the EU 
are mostly founded on its treatment of women, history of political turmoil, and 
Islamic identity. In addition to this, Nugent (2007)175 believes that Turkish 
acceptance into the EU may also weaken the political influence of some of the 	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other EU countries: “Turkish membership will result in existing large and 
medium-sized member states losing significant physical presence in the 
European Parliament and proportionate voting strengths in the Council of 
Ministers.” While Turkey’s economic underdevelopment and size may burden 
the EU fiscally, the social and cultural distinctiveness of Turkey is certainly a 
greater cause for concern. 
 
 2.2 From Turkey to Germany 
 The fears of Turkish membership in the EU can be better comprehended 
by considering its relationship with Germany. In 1961, Germany signed a 
bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey, at a time when Germany’s 
economy was strong and demand for labor seemed limitless. Endeavoring to 
employ predominantly semi-skilled and unskilled Turkish migrants who were at 
the “prime of their labor capacity,” Germany viewed the migration of Turkish 
migrants as an investment in their economic future, lifting tax revenues and 
production levels at the height of German economic advancement (Bartsch et al. 
2010).176 The incorporation of these low-skilled Turkish migrants helped enable 
upward mobility for many German workers, so much so that between 1960 and 
1970, approximately 2.3 million German workers were elevated from blue-collar 
to white-collar employment.177 It is important to emphasize that the acceptance of 
this migration was purely economic in nature; it was not, in any way, intended to 
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support the European Union’s or any member state’s desire to implement 
diversity. 
Such enthusiasm on the part of Germany, however, did not take into 
account the realistic future expectations of these Turkish migrants, many of 
whom saw migration to Germany as a permanent decision. In a German 
magazine, Spiegel International, journalists expressed this lackadaisical attitude of 
Germany: “at the time, no one in Germany cared much about the fact that many 
of the new arrivals could hardly read or write, making it difficult for them to 
participate in German society. The guest workers, or Gastarbeiter, were expected 
to live together in newly built dormitories near the factories where they worked, 
and return to their native countries after working for a few years.”178 The reality 
was that many Turks delayed their return home, especially once the “rotation 
clause”, which limited Turkish guest workers’ stay, was abolished in the 1964 
German-Turkish treaty.  
In 1973, German recruitment of the Turkish labor force ended, just as the 
Turks had become “the most prominent symbol of the guest worker in the eyes 
of the German public.”179 In the media and throughout the rhetoric of German 
politics, this visible face of the Turks perpetuated this notion of the Turkish issue. 
How would they change German society? Would they be granted citizenship? 
For many Germans, the stark cultural differences between themselves and the 
Turks were too profound. Their cultural and religious loyalty to Turkey was 
linked to extremism and therefore, spurring racist and violent attacks in the 
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1990s.180 This intensified in 2005 when German citizenship law determined that 
nationality would be defined by birth, giving second-generation Turkish 
immigrants German citizenship.  
 Today, the Turks are the second largest group, after German emigrants, to 
reside in Germany. Despite not being a EU member state, the presence of the 
Turkish population in Germany shapes Germany’s migration policy, and in turn, 
that of the European Union. In an article published after a 2011 conference on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish migration to Germany, Asiye Kaya of 
Georgetown University asks what the significance is for German diversity and 
public opinion on migration: “given that the agreement with Turkey was the first 
with a country considered to be non-European and with Islamic faith, what is the 
significance of this for the past fifty years of German immigration history and in 
years since 9/11?”181 Statistically, in 2013, 20 percent of the German population 
had a migrant background, many of these from Turkey. 
This burgeoning migration has not necessarily produced the acceptance of 
diversity in Germany, despite changes in German policy that relaxed citizenship 
so that more Turks could be eligible to apply; an “ethnicized” view of citizenship 
is still the largest barrier for Turks to feel included and accepted in German 
society and it is not clear whether or not ethnic belongingness and citizenship 
can cohabit.182 For some scholars, like Cornelia Wilhelm, Germans must embrace a 
“new understanding of Germanness, one that expands out of a broader discourse 
on the social reality of Germany and the patterns of constructing diversity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Kaya, Asiye. p. 4 
181 Kaya, Asiye. p. 2 
182 Kaya, Asiye. p. 6-7 
	   105 
cultural difference, memory, and identity.”183 Turkey, Europe’s “quintessentially 
unpopular second-class neighbor”, has repeatedly applied for EU membership, 
first in 1959 for the European Economic Community (Mandel 2013).184 Despite 
decades of reforming the Ottoman Empire’s heritage and practices, abolishing 
the death penalty, limiting military power, and adopting the European 
Convention on Human Rights, all modeled after Western Europe, Turkey is one 
of few European countries without EU membership.185 
So what prevents Turkey from obtaining EU membership? What is it that 
truly differentiates Turkey from every other country that has joined the EU? 
Many argue that rather than being its inability to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, 
or a list of political and economic conditions, which must be met for EU 
membership, it is the role played by Islam and the historical reputation of the 
Ottoman Empire.186 A certain sense of Uberfremdung, or “over-foreignization” is in 
the air for many Europeans who feel that Turkey’s historical affiliation with 
violence, crime, and extremism can never be forgotten, and its religious 
affiliation certainly cannot.187 Many Germans even claim that Turks do not wish to 
integrate into German society, that their devotion to the head scarf, and many of 
Turkey’s prohibitions on liberties, such as freedom of the press, signals their lack 
of interest in a mainstream German, and likewise, EU way of life. Germans too, 
who believe the “others” of Germany are the Turks, resist the idea of accepting 
Turkish immigrants: “Turkish accession threatens that basis of the structural 
opposition that defines the relationship. If the Other becomes ‘us’, then who are 	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we? Still more problematic is what if that day has arrived, given the high 
members of Turks who have become naturalized German citizens” (Mandel 
2013).188  
 
 2.3 Public Opinion on Turkish immigrants 
 As mentioned previously, public opinion data on Turkish immigrants 
largely suggests that a certain difference exists between Turks and migrants from 
within the EU. As expressed in a study by Başak Yavçan (2013)189, immigrants 
cannot be grouped together and their opposition is oftentimes grounded in the 
fear of a cultural invasion, rather than their economic threat. Yavçan shows that 
support of the EU is highly dependent on one’s socioeconomic status and 
occupation: “this is because, for those individuals who are better off 
economically, the EU project appears to be a much more beneficial and desirable 
process than it is for poorer, less educated and lower class individuals.”190 Yet, 
even despite high socioeconomic standing, reservations about the EU still remain 
high if an individual feels that the cultural values and the nation state are being 
compromised.  
 In his study, Yavçan tests how ethnically German citizens respond to the 
inclusion of Turkish, Italian, and Polish citizens in Germany. The purpose of the 
study was to determine whether certain ethnic groups increase or decrease the 
support for European integration and EU enlargement. Yavçan’s study found 
that when individuals were prompted with media portrayal of Turkish 
immigrants, their feedback regarding EU integration and EU enlargement was 	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mostly negative, given that, as compared to Polish and Italian migrants, Turkish 
immigrants are culturally, significantly different. Such results were less intense 
when individuals were primed with information on Polish or Italian 
immigrants.191 Ultimately, what this study implies is that “the hierarchy people 
have in mind when considering potential immigrant groups extends to their 
attitudes toward areas that they see these anti-immigration attitudes as closely 
linked to.”192 
Figure 18. Relationship between Euroskepticism, Opposition to EU Enlargement and Immigration Attitudes 
when Primed with Different Ethnic Groups 
	  
Source: Başak Yavçan (2013) 
 
 From the perspective of Muslim immigrants to Europe, a Pew Research 
Center report suggests that Muslims are more concerned with the economic 
situation of the EU more so than the issue of religious rights and cultural 
identity: “Muslims there [Europe] do not generally believe that most Europeans 
are hostile toward people of their faith.193 This hostility is only slightly more 
pronounced in Britain, where Muslims worry for their future. While another Pew 	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Research Center poll suggests that EU nations have a more positive view of 
Muslims than they do of Roma, or gypsies, such favorability is not robust 
enough to make Muslim integration in Europe a non-issue.194 
 
3. National Identity vs. European Identity 
 3.1 Public Opinion on the European Union 
 Public opinion on Turkish accession can be better understood through the 
lens of public opinion polls on the European Union as a whole. In one Pew 
Research Center article entitled “The New Sick Man in Europe: the European 
Union”, Germans, Britons, French, Italians, Spanish, Greeks, Poles, and Czechs 
were asked to whether or not their support for the European Project has 
increased or declined. Specifically, they were asked if the economic integration of 
member states has served to strengthen the economy. In comparing results 
between the years 2012 and 2013, all national groups polled believed that 
economic integration has not improved the economic standing of the member 
states.195 These beliefs were stronger for Germans and Britons, and less strong for 
the Poles, Greeks and the Czechs. Most notably however, this “erosion of 
Europeans’ faith” has become increasingly evident in attitudes by the French, 
where in 2013 58% saw the EU as an unfavorable institution to be a part of, 
widening the gap between them and the customarily optimistic Germans.196 
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Figure 19. Decline in Support for the European Project. 
	  
Source: Pew Research Center (2013) 
 
 In another 2013 Pew Research Center public opinion poll, Germany’s so-
called economic “exceptionalism” in the EU was viewed as problematic for EU 
integration, stating that the large divide between German sentiment of the EU 
and the remainder of EU member states poses a huge threat to member state 
relations, as Germany will undoubtedly have a sizeable say on EU policy.197 As 
previously mentioned, Germans have traditionally been most pro-EU, 
particularly given its economic success within it. In relation to the EU median, 
Germans feel 28 points better about European integration and 66 points better 
about the economy.198 This can be compared to countries like Italy, where 62% 
believe immigration is a large issue and only 16% were content with the 
country’s economic standing.199 
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 In 2015, Pew Research Center suggested that citizens are beginning to look 
more favorably on the EU, despite the challenging political environment and 
former economic crisis. The article draws the following correlation: “those who 
now think economic conditions are good are much more likely to favor the EU 
and European economic integration than those who see their economy as doing 
poorly. At the same time, in some nations there are quite significant differences 
between the higher level of trust in the EU as an institution and the lower public 
confidence in the European project.”200 While centered mostly on Europeans’ 
perceptions on economic integration, polls like this one can be used to infer how 
these viewpoints coincide with opinions on cultural integration. If economic 
conditions are poor, cultural integration will be seen as less favorable.  
 
 3.2 Where do they stand? 
 Europeanization for Turkey is in the progress of taking root, despite 
Turkey’s continual denunciation for EU acceptance. Since 2001, Turkey has 
adopted a series of new policies that align with EU values: “the most noticeable 
of these changes have been in the highly-charged spheres of democratic and civil 
rights where, in many instances as part of new penal and civil codes, reforms 
have included a liberalization of the judicial system, stronger protections and 
rights for minorities, a greater emphasis on the importance of individual liberties 
and the abolition of the death penalty.”201 Still, Turkey has far to go if it ever 
wishes to sway its opposition for EU entry, and unless it were to compromise 
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heavily on its religious and political values, the possibility of EU entry seems 
highly unlikely.   
Nevertheless, this opportunity to discuss a possible inclusion of Turkey in 
the EU reaffirms the central principles of the European Union, strengthening its 
core values and allowing it to be better defined by something more than an 
abstract idea. According to Nilufer Gole, who speaks on European identity, 
“Europeanness is not part of a ‘natural’ historical legacy, it is appropriated 
voluntarily as a political project, as a perspective promising a democratic frame 
for rethinking commonness and difference.” Discussing the possibly of Turkey in 
the EU “reveals the difference between Europe as a project and Europe as an 
identity,” and going forward, it is this kind of distinction that the EU can use as 
an advantage to better brand itself for the future progress of its twenty-eight 
member states.202 
For Britain, the potential addition of Turkey in the EU calls into question 
how the various implications of intra-EU migration will affect British society and 
their attachment to the institution of the EU. How far is Britain willing to go to 
express its dislike of intra-EU migration? Will it go as far as to dismiss the 
benefits it receives as a EU member state when the June 2016 UK referendum is 
held? As discussed previously in this thesis, migrants to Britain are directly 
impacted by the backlash of free movement. By the same token, many British 
citizens themselves openly indulge in the ability to move freely across borders. 
With the UK referendum just around the corner, it is unlikely that British 
animosity towards intra-EU migration will wane; rather, as the research in this 	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thesis shows, intra-EU migration will continue to be an issue pronounced in the 
media, in economic reports, and in the rhetoric of politicians in Britain, until 
Britain either risks leaving the EU or devises a plan to effectively deal with the 
issues surrounding intra-EU migration. 
In the future, Britain must come to terms with its relationship with EU 
migrants and the EU as a whole, forced to decide where its priorities lie and to 
bridge the gap between the economic evidence of intra-EU migration and the 
political ways in which intra-EU migration is debated and discussed. This may 
require further research that demonstrates a more transparent understanding of 
the economic arguments behind scholars in the field and an analysis of the UK 
referendum post this June.  
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